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Boyd: Boyd: Religious and Cultural Objects

Disputes Regarding the Possession
of Native American Religious and
Cultural Objects and Human Remains:
A Discussion of the Applicable Law
and Proposed Legislation
Thomas H. Boyd"

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States' policy concerning Native Americans has fluctuated and
changed a great deal. During the evolution of this policy, there has been great
unfairness and inequity in the negotiation and enforcement of treaties and in
the application of federal legislation. Until just three decades ago the federal
government actively pursued a policy of cultural destruction through the
assimilation of Native American tribes into mainstream American culture.'
We, as a nation and as individual states, have begun only recently to chart a
course that respects Native American culture and heritage.
Throughout the many chapters in the United States' policy concerning
Native Americans, museums have played a vital role in preserving tribal
antiquities. 2 Museums have also served as the medium through which
Americans have learned, studied, and celebrated Native American cultures.
There is presently a movement by Native Americans, individuals, and tribal
organizations, however, to regain posession of human skeletal remains and
religious and cultural objects 3 that are presently in the possession and under
the control of public museums. Direct lineal descendants seek to recover their
Associate, Winthrop & Weinstine, St. Paul, Minnesota. B.A., M.A., and J.D.,
University of Iowa. Member of the Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri Bars.
1. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 152-80 (1982). See also C.
*

WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOcIETIES IN A

MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DFMOCRACY ix (1987) (discusses "assimilationist policies").
2. Echo-Hawk, Museum Rights vs. Indian Rights: Guidelines for Assessing

Competing LegalInterests in Native CulturalResources, 14 REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
437, 438 (1986).
3. These items are often collectively referred to as "artifacts." This unfortunate
term fails to reflect the great contemporary value these cultural and religious objects
hold for Native Americans. Furthermore, the term is highly disrespectful when applied
to describe human skeletal remains.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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ancestors' remains for reburial. Tribes have requested the return of certain
sacred objects that are essential to ongoing religious practices. Native
Americans have also made requests to obtain possession of objects of general
cultural significance. This situation creates a conflict between the museum's
objectives of preservation, research, and education, and the Native Americans'
interests in the reburial of human remains and the possession and use of
important religious and other cultural objects.4 This dilemma was recently
highlighted on a national level when Stanford University announced that it
would return the remains of approximately 550 Ohlone Indians for reburial by
their descendants in northern California.5
Stanford's decision was the culmination of more than two years of
negotiation with Native American leaders.6 The chair of Stanford's anthropology department described the University's evaluation of the competing
interests involved in this situation:
One is the religious beliefs and sensitivities of a population of living Native
Americans, some of whom are our fellow staff members and students. The
other is our obligation to the future scientific community. We decided to
give more weight to the first than the second, though other anthropologists
may decide otherwise.
Soon after Stanford agreed to return these remains, the University of
Minnesota announced that it too would return approximately 1,000 Native
American bones and skulls for reburial at the request of the Minnesota Indian
Affairs Council. 8 In a "debate that pit[ted] Indian concerns about the
sacredness of their ancestors' remains against scientists' reluctance to lose
access to material that some day might provide insights to human history or
lead to breakthroughs in health and medicine," state officials apparently bowed
to what they perceived to be the popular consensus to return the remains.9

4. To the scientist, reburial of human remains and active "consumption" of
religious and cultural objects means the deterioration and eventual destruction of these
objects. At the same time, many Native Americans feel that possession and use of
these objects is essential to their own or their ancestors' spiritual fulfillment.
Correspondingly, the inability to possess and/or use these items may result in the
inability to achieve spiritual satisfaction and inner peace.
5. N.Y. Times, June 24, 1989, at 1, col. 2.
6. Id.
7. id.
8. St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch, July 16, 1989, at 1B, col. 2.
9. Id. at 1B, 4B. The Stanford and Minnesota decisions involve just two
examples of the many requests made by Native Americans and Native American
Groups for the return of religious and cultural objects and human remains, and the
corresponding balance made with respect to the museums' interest in retaining
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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There have also been significant examples in which museums have
worked with Native American groups with respect to transferring possession
of extremely important cultural treasures and religious objects. For instance,
the New York State Museum returned Wampum belts to the Onondaga
Nation'0 and the Zuni have obtained the return of their War Gods." The
Smithsonian has moved toward returning some of its vast inventory of human
remains, as well as religious and cultural objects, "that can be linked with
'reasonable certainty' to present-day tribes.' 2 Congress has contributed to
this policy through the enactment of the National Museum of the American
Indian Act 13 that contains a process through which Native Americans may
obtain the return of human remains and funerary objects.' 4
These examples reflect a spirit of compromise and a growing sensitivity
and understanding of Native American concerns by public institutions. There
is nonetheless much work to be done, particularly with regard to religious and
cultural objects, before this conflict between scientific and cultural or spiritual
interests is resolved. In the years to come, many institutions will be
compelled to make their own evaluation of these same interests. This article
reviews a number of the arguments that are made by Native Americans and
museums, respectively, and discusses the applicable law.
An examination of federal and state statutes reveals an extensive network
of protection of both scientific and Native American interests with regard to
human remains and objects that have been discovered in recent times and that
will be discovered in the future. 5 Objects and human remains that have
been discovered in the past few decades and that will be discovered in the
future are subject to the regulation of federal and state legislation. Objects
that were acquired before this legislation was enacted, however, present
unique problems that require case-by-case evaluation. The challenge,

possession of the objects. See Blair, Indian Rights: Native Americans Versus
American Museums-A Battle for Artifacts, 7 AM. IND. L. REV. 125, 125-28 (1979);
Wilson & Zingg, What Is America's Heritage?Historic Preservationand American
Indian Culture, 22 U. KAN. L. REV. 413, 418-20 (1974); Testimony of Dr. Raymond

H. Thompson on behalf of the American Association of Museums before the Interior
and Insular Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives at 1-5 (July 17,
1990).
10. Statement of Martin E. Sullivan, Director, The Heard Museum, Phoenix,
Arizona, Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U.S. House of
Representatives at Exhibit B (July 17, 1990).
11. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at 1A, col. 1.
12. N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1989, at 22, col. 1; St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch,
Sept. 13, 1989, at 7A, col. 4.
13. 20 U.S.C. §§ 80q-1 to -15 (Supp. 1990).
14. Id. §§ 80q-9 to -12.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 39-125.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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therefore, is to formulate a process through which the interests of both
scientists and Native Americans can be fairly evaluated in determining the
proper disposition of those objects and human remains that are not presently
regulated by existing federal and state legislation. Litigation is, of course, an
option. There is very little law, however, directly relating to these issues, and
principles of property and contract law could be argued to favor either side of
this question. 16
Thus, litigation promises only unpredictability while
requiring the extensive expenditure of resources by parties whose resources are
already very limited. This article also reviews proposed legislation offering
methods through which disputes over the rights of ownership and possession
of these objects and remains might be resolved without the need, yet also
without the waiver of the parties' rights, to pursue these issues before a court
of law.

II. TERMS
For purposes of discussing the ownership of human remains and objects
identified as Native American or associated with Native American culture, it
is important to highlight a number of fundamental concepts. The discussion
in this section is admittedly very abstract. It is simply intended to provide a
framework through which to consider relevant issues.
A. Categories of Objects
The law of ownership and the corresponding right to possession and
control differs depending upon the type of object at issue. Consequently, the
recognition of the different object-types is important.
1. Human Remains. Some parties have asserted that federal agencies and
museums in the United States have gathered hundreds of thousands of human
skeletal remains.17 The overwhelming majority of these human remains have
Native American association or origin.18 The most notable example of such
a collection involves the Smithsonian Institution's accumulation of over
18,000 Native American skeletal remainsY

16. See infra text accompanying notes 126-208.
17. Bowman, The Reburial ofNative American Skeletal Remains:Approaches to
the Resolution of a Conflict, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 147, 149 (1989) (estimates the
number of human remains contained in American museum collections to exceed
300,000).
18. Id. (estimates 99% of human remains in collections are Native American).
19. H. REP. No. 340(I), 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 776, 778.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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Many individual Native Americans and Native American groups have
sought to take possession of these remains for reburial. While emphasizing
a willingness to consider each request on a case-by-case basis, museums have
generally resisted these efforts for a number of reasons. 20 First and foremost,
these remains have inestimatable scientific value:
Mortuary evidence is an integral part of the archaeological record of past
culture and behavior in that it informs directly upon social structure and
organization and, less directly, upon aspects of religion and ideology.
Human remains, as an integral part of the mortuary record, provide unique
information about demography, diet, disease, and genetic relationships
among human groups. Research in archaeology, bioarchaeology, biological
anthropology, and medicine depends upon responsible scholars having
collections of human remains available both for replicative research and
research21 that addresses new questions or employs new analytical techniques.
Moreover, a museum that indiscriminately disposes of its collection
undermines its own scientific mission and seriously damages its credibility as
an institution. 22 These types of transfers may also constitute a breach of the

20. Blair, supra note 9, at 128. One commentator argues that museums generally
rely on four basic arguments to support their refusal to transfer possession of Native
American religious and cultural objects and human remains: "(1) their public
responsibility to preserve and exhibit the artifacts for the benefit of all Americans; (2)
their doubt as to specific Indian ownership; (3) their unwillingness to establish
precedent of returning a part of their collections to original owners; and (4) their legal
claims to the artifacts." Id.
21. Executive Committee, The Society for American Archaeology, Statement
Concerning the Treatment of Human Remains 1 (May 1986). See also Palacios &
Johnson, An Overview of Archaeology and the Law: Seventy Years of Unexploited
Protectionfor PrehistoricResources, 51 NOTRE DAME LAw. 706, 706 (1976).
22. In relation to pressure on institutions to transfer possession of religious and
cultural objects and human remains to Native Americans, there is also significant
pressure by members of the archaeological, anthropological, and other related fields
who consider the return of these objects to be a breach of professional responsibility.
In the delicate area of acquisition and disposal of museum objects, the
museum must weigh carefully the interest of the public for which it holds
the collection in trust, the donors intent in the broadest sense, the interest
of the scholarly and the cultural community, and the institution's own
financial wellbeing.
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS, MUSEUM ETHICS 11-12 (1978). In particular,
the study and display of human remains is acknowledged as a necessary and
responsible scientific exercise. Id. at 15.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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institutions' legal duties as fiduciaries with respect to the maintenance of
collections for the benefit of the general public.2
At the same time, many Native Americans assert serious concerns relating
to the effect that disinterment has on the decedent's spirituality:
Although the concept of Indian spirituality is pervasive throughout
Indian culture, each tribe's spiritual views vary. For example, the
Kumeyaay Indians believe that when a body is buried, the spirit is sent to
the afterworld. If the body is disturbed, however, the spirit is brought back.
This returned spirit is in pain and will disturb its descendants until the body
is reinterred with the proper ceremonies. Some Native Americans have
even testified that they can personally feel the unrest of their ancestors
when their bodies have been removed from the earth. Other Native
American religious beliefs, however, do not attest to a wandering of the
spirit. For example, the Mesquakie Tribe (Iowa) believes that four days
after death the spirit leaves forever, and what happens to the body after that
only
is inconsequential. They, however, still believe that reburial is the
24
proper and respectful treatment for the remains of a human being.
Under the common law, no person may own a dead body.25 Instead,
persons immediately related to or specifically designated by the decedent are
deemed trustees who may have a quasi-property right for the exclusive

23. M. MALARO, A LEGAL PRIMER ON MANAGING MUSEUM COLLECTIONS 15-18
(1985); M. MALARO, THE MUSEUM'S PERSPECTIVE, IN PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES: ART LAW A.2.(a)-(g)
(1988). See Stem v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l Training School for Deaconesses and
Missionaries, 381 F. Supp. 1003 (D.D.C. 1974); Rowan v. Pasedena Art Museum, No.
C-322817, slip op. at 6 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 1981); Illinois v.
Silverstein, 86 IIl. App. 3d. 605, 408 N.E.2d 243 (1980). "An ethical duty of
museums is to transfer to our successors, when possible in enhanced form, the material
record of human culture in the natural world." AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MUSEUMS,
supra note 22, at 11. "The governing body of a museum, usually a board of trustees,
serves the public interest as it relates to the museum... the governing board holds the
ultimate fiduciary responsibility for the museum and for the protection and nurturing
of its various assets." Id. at 27. See also INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS,
STATUTES/CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1987).
24. Bowman, supra note 13, at 149.
25. Cadavernullius in bonis ("no one may have a right of property in a corpse").
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 183 (5th ed. 1979). It must be noted that all skeletal
remanins do not necessarily constitute a dead body. Common law and statutory
definitions for a dead body hinge on the level of decomposition and dismemberment.
T. STUEVE, MORTUARY LAw 9-10 (7th rev. ed. 1984).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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purpose of proper interment. 26 While museums are not legally obligated to
provide for the reinterment of human remains, common law prohibits the
institution from transferring possession and control to parties who are not
trustees obligated to reinter.27
Two important distinctions have been made with regard to the issue of
returning human remains. First, it has been argued that return of remains
should only take place where the parties seeking return for reburial are able
to demonstrate a biological or cultural relationship with the decedent sufficient
to establish authority to take possession of the decedent's remains.2
Although there is no property right as such in a dead body, as previously
stated the right to possession for the purpose of reinterment has been
recognized as a quasi-property right.29 One must have a sufficiently close
legal relationship, either as a blood relative or as an appointed trustee, to be
able to assert a claim to take possession of a deceased person's remains.3
Second, the date or period from which the remains originate has been
considered important. It is, of course, more difficult for an individual to prove
a relationship with older remains. However, even where that would be
possible, the older remains have greater scientific value and, therefore, are a
more significant part of a museum's collection. 31 Consequently, the relevant
policy considerations vary in relative strength depending upon the identification of the objects with present day lineal descendants and the age of the
human remains at issue.

26. T. STUEVE, supra note 25, at 10-15.
27. Statement by the American Association of Museums to the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs on the Legal Issues Relating to Proposed Substitute
Legislation S. 1980, at 11 (June 4, 1990).
28. Blair, supra note 9, at 130. Indeed, this standard is embodied in a policy the
Smithsonian Institution had adopted prior to the enactment of the National Museum
of the American Indian Act. Adams, 18 SMrrHSONIAN 12, 12 (May 1987) ("Stolen or
not, we at the Smithsonian recognize an obligation to return all remains that are
individually identifiable from accompanying records.").
29. Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717 (8th Cir. 1984); Strachan v. John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp., 209 N.J. Super. 300, 507 A.2d 718 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986);
McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp., 167 Ga. App. 495, 306 S.E.2d 746 (1983); Sullivan
v. Catholic Cemeteries, Inc., 113 R.I. 65, 317 A.2d 430 (1974); Parker v. QuinnMcGowen Co., 262 N.C. 560, 138 S.E.2d 214 (1964); Barela v. Frank A. Hubbell Co.,
67 N.M. 319, 355 P.2d 133 (1960).
30. The determination of who these parties are may very well be an issue of tribal
law to be determined by a tribal court. See Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737,
741-42 (S.D. 1985).
31. Of course, this is not to concede that human remains discovered recently lack
scientific significance. See supra text accompanying note 14.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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2. "FuneraryObjects." Generally speaking, the terms "grave objects" and
"funerary objects" include all items that are referred to as mortuary evidence
aside from human remains. All grave objects are initially related to a grave
or burial site. For a number of reasons, however, these objects are sometimes
separated from the total burial composition. Therefore, there is a distinction
made between "associated" and "unassociated" grave objects.32 In any event,
there is an argument that if a party is able to prove a relationship to the
human remains, the right to the return of those remains would also include the
right to the return of any accompanying grave objects.33 Of course, any
transfer of possession and control of grave objects must be conditioned on the
reinterment of the objects with the human remains.
3. Religious Objects. Religious or ceremonial objects would include any
items that relate to the current practices of Native American religions. These
objects are unique in that: (1) they may give rise to possible first amendment
concerns relating to free exercise of religious practices;34 and (2) unlike
situations involving human remains and funerary objects where it may be
argued that only those individuals who demonstrate a lineal or legal
relationship may take possession, in the case of ceremonial or sacred objects
that are necessary to ongoing religious ceremonies the entire tribe membership
may seek their return because it uniformly affects their ability to freely
practice their religion. 5 As with human remains, there is an additional
ethical concern relating to the possession of religious objects and to their
display in public museums:

32.
Certainly, the non-associated materials were once associated with the
individuals or sites but, they are no longer. They have been changed to
being material cultural remnants rather than personal attentions. This is
unfortunate and often the result of pot-hunting and other illegal or unethical
practices-usually by private citizens. However, it is a reality and, it is
also reality that these objects (vast in number) constitute much of what is
known of many cultures.
Testimony of Phillip M. Thompson, Director, Museum of Northern Arizona to the
United States Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs at 6 (May 14, 1990).
33. It could be argued that a trust exists. The party in possession of the human
remains is said to be holding the remains in trust for the those persons who are
charged with the duty of interment. P. JACKSON, THE LAW OF CADAVERS AND OF
BURIAL AND BURIAL PLACES 142-43 (2d ed. 1950). Because a deceased person's body
becomes an object, a reasonable conclusion might be that grave goods buried with the
human remains should enjoy the same status.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 130-57.
35. See Blair, supra note 9, at 125-28.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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Do you see a display of the masks of the gods of the Christian, or of the
Jew, or of Islam, or of any other culture strong enough to defend its faith
and to punish such a desecration? Where is the representation of the Great
God Jehovah who led the Jews out of their bondage in Egypt, or the Mask
of Michael the Archangel, or the Mother of the Christian God we call Jesus
Christ, or a personification of Jesus himself? ... [Instead] you see the
in the public zoo.
gods of conquered people displayed like exotic animals
36
Only the overthrown and captured gods are here.
It is important to understand that while anthropologists and archaeologists
consider these objects data and specimens that must be preserved for study
and for the benefit of the general public and future generations, many Native
Americans consider these objects vital to the current practice of their religious
beliefs. 7 In other words, many of these objects, while certainly historic, also
have substantial meaning and utility in the contemporary lives of Native
Advocacy for active use obviously conflicts with the
Americans,3
preservationist's view because it involves consumption and leads to the
deterioration and perhaps the eventual destruction of the objects.39
4. Cultural Objects. This category simply refers to all additional items
that exist in museum collections but cannot be categorized as either mortuary
evidence or religious objects. Cultural objects hold particular significance to
Native Americans in the preservation of their heritage and their understanding
of their ancestors' way of life. "The rudiments of religion, law, social
structures, familial relationships, morals and aesthetics-virtually everything
which defines man as a unique species-are contained in the annals of
prehistory.,40 Additionally, these objects have great monetary value and
might be viewed as a financial asset similar to mineral, hunting, and fishing

36. T. HILLERMAN, TALKING GOD 205 (1989). Not only are Native Americans
deprived of the use of many sacred objects, but often these objects are irreverently
displayed by their institutional custodians. See, e.g., St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch,
Sept. 27, 1989, at 3A, col. 1 (statue returned to Zuni Indians after improperly
displayed by University of Maine).
37. Blair, supra note 9, at 128-29.
38. For example, New York State Museum recently returned twelve wampum
belts to the Council of Chiefs of the Onondaga Nation. These belts record events that
relate to the communal affairs of the Iroquois Confederacy, the Onondaga Nation, and
within the Nation. Possession of these belts was transferred from the Onondaga at the
turn of this century. In seeking repossession, the Onondaga Nation asserted that once
returned these belts would be restrung and actively used in their ceremonies. See
supra note 10.
39. N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1990, at 1A,col. 1.
40. Palacios & Johnson, supra note 21, at 706-07.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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rights. 41 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the general issue of whether
possession of cultural objects, religious objects, and human remains should be
transferred yields great political leverage to the Native American movement.
There is immense emotional appeal and popular sympathy for Native
American requests for the "return" of their ancestors' remains and cultural
treasures.42
B. Categories of Land Ownership
While it may or may not be possible for an individual or an institution to
truly own a deceased person's remains and associated funerary objects, sacred
and cultural objects can be viewed through traditional notions of title. The
ownership of the land upon which the cultural or religious objects are found,
or from which they are excavated, may be the controlling factor in determining the competing interests for rights of control, possession, and legal title.
1. Federal Land. The United States owns enormous tracts of land.
Because Native Americans once occupied much of this area, there is
doubtlessly a great deal of evidence of their presence contained on this land.
When objects are excavated from federally owned property, the United States
generally has the strongest claim for ownership.4 3 The issue, therefore,
becomes a matter of who the government should entrust to possess these
objects: a museum or a like institution with similar educational and research
objectives or the Native Americans with whom these objects are associated.
2. Native American Land. A great deal of land controlled by the United
States is actually held in trust on behalf of certain Native American tribes or
individuals. Consequently, this land is not freely alienable by Native
Americans. For instance, the Indian Nonintercourse Act provides that no
transaction between any Native American tribe and another entity concerning
certain restricted lands shall be valid without the consent of the United
States.' Similarly, the General Allotment Act rendered null and void any
45
conveyance of allotment lands before the expiration of the trust period.
Although they have only equitable title, consent from the Native Americans
is usually necessary before excavation or removal of human remains and
cultural and religious objects from these lands may take place.
1

41. If they so chose, Native Americans could display these objects in tribal
museums and thereby generate revenue through tourism. These objects could also be
offered for sale in the highly lucrative market for archaeological treasures. See Chilkat
Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1989).
42. See supra text accompanying note 8.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 39-88.
44. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
45. Id. § 348.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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3. PrivateLand. Generally, ownership of the objects contained on real
property passes with the title of that real property. Thus, private owners have
a very strong claim for title to religious and cultural objects excavated from
their property. This same concept would apply to any land which was owned
in fee by Native Americans.6
III. STATUTORY PROTECTION OF NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURAL

AND RELIGIOUS OBJECTS AND HUMAN REMAINS
A. FederalStatutes
During this century, the federal government has pursued a policy to
preserve the historic locations, structures, and objects that make up America's
heritage. 7 Preservation of the cultural past of Native Americans has been
a substantial. part of this policy.
1. Antiquities Act of 1906. The Antiquities Act of 1906 was enacted to
punish "[a]ny person who shall appropriate, excavate, injure, or destroy any
historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of antiquity" that is
situated on federal lands without first obtaining permission from the Secretary
of the Department that has jurisdiction over that land.' s The primary goal
of the Antiquities Act of 1906 was to preserve sites that contain information
about the past through excavation and other types of investigation, and to
facilitate the acquisition of objects for permanent preservation as part of the
collections contained in public museums.49
The Antiquities Act of 1906 has been considered inadequate and
ineffective for a number of reasons. The sanction which accompanies any
violation of the Act is limited to a $500 fine, ninety days' imprisonment, or
both fine and imprisonment.50 It has been said that this punishment "consti-

46. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 619. See, e.g., Dillon v. Antler Land Co., 507
F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
47. Prior to 1906, historic preservation was undertaken through "private financing
of excavations and museums, and private legal remedies such as trespass or
conversion. There were no federal regulatory or enabling provisions." Palacios &
Johnson, supra note 21, at 708.
48. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1982). For example, applications for permits are submitted

to the Smithsonian Institution for recommendation to the Secretary of the Interior. 43
C.F.R. § 3.8 (1988).
49. Wilson & Zingg, supra note 9, at 424. This objective is clearly reflected in
the restrictions on permits which limit applicants to "reputable museums, universities,
colleges, or other recognized scientific or educational institutions, or to their duly
authorized agents." 43 C.F.R. § 3.3 (1988).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1982).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
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tutes little more than a business expense for the modern pothunter receiving
up to thousands of dollars for a single pot."5' In addition, the 1906 Act
focuses solely on a limited number of sites of outstanding national interest.
"It offers no direct protection for the many cliff dwellings, burial mounds and
other Indian grave sites located on private or state owned lands ....
More importantly, this statute was rendered virtually useless when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, whose jurisdiction includes part
of the southwest and all of the Pacific coast, declared that its failure to define
"ruin," "monument," or "object of antiquity" renders the Antiquities Act
unconstitutionally vague.53
2. NationalHistoric PreservationAct of 1966. Since the enactment of
the Antiquities Act of 1906, Congress has firmly established the federal
government's role in preserving this nation's heritage. 54 Through the
Historic Sites Act of 1935, the United States clearly contemplated the
identification, recovery, preservation, and display of archaeological data "for
public use."5 5 This goal was furthered through the creation of the National
Trust for Historic Preservation in the United States.56 The purpose of this

51. Blair, supra note 9, at 143 (footnotes omitted). A "pothunter" can be
described as an
individual who removes an archaeological artifact from the site without
regard to its contextual provenance and then sells, trades, or collects it as
an objet d'art. Archaeological resources are nonrenewable. The context in
which an archaeological artifact or feature is found is at least as important
as the artifact or feature itself, and a site which has been disturbed has
permanently lost a considerable amount of its significance.
Palacios & Johnson, supra note 21, at 707-08 (footnotes omitted).
52. Wilson & Zingg, supra note 9, at 425.
53. United States v. Diaz, 499 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir. 1974). While the ruling
in Diaz made prosecution under other statutes, as well as under the Antiquities Act,
very difficult, it must be noted that the Ninth Circuit has subsequently determined that
Congress did not intend the Antiquities Act to be the exclusive means for prosecution
of antiquity theft and destruction. United States v. Jones, 607 F.2d 269 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1085 (1980). Furthermore, not all jurisdictions have
found the Act unconstitutional. See United States v. Smyer, 569 F.2d 939 (10th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979).
54. Comment, Archaeological Preservation on Indian Lands: Conflicts and
Dilemmas in Applying the NationalHistoricPreservationAct, 15 ENVTL. L. 413, 421
(1985). Through the enactment of the Historic Sites Buildings, and Antiquities Act of
1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461-467 (1982), the federal government commenced a program to
identify and evaluate historic properties, both real and personal, of national significance.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (1982).
56. Id. §§ 468-468c.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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entity was to accept, maintain, and administer properties donated to the United
States as a trustee on behalf of the American public."
Subsequently, Congress enacted the National Historic Preservation Act
of 196658 which proclaimed that "the preservation of [America's] irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its vital legacy of cultural,
educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy benefits will be
maintained and enriched for future generations of Americans. ,59 To
"administer federally owned, administered, or controlled prehistoric and
historic resources in a spirit of stewardship for the inspiration and benefit of
present and future generations,"' the 1966 Act authorizes the Secretary of
the Interior to maintain a National Register 6' of specific structures, as well
as general areas or districts, that are significant in American history,
architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture. 2 The 1966 Act further
authorizes the Secretary to ,allocate matching grants-in-aid to the States in
support of local efforts to survey and preserve historic structures and
districts.6
In pursuing the 1966 Act's objective of preserving prehistoric and historic
locations and objects, Congress placed a premium on involvement of the
scientific community. '4 Congress also formally recognized the vital need for
an active partnership between educational institutions, historical societies, and
the various scientific associations to ensure the involvement of groups that are
capable of providing skilled research and proper preservation techniques.65
At the same time, Congress attempted to encourage Native American
participation in the policy-developing and decision-making process.'
Indeed, the 1966 Act states that the policy of preservation will be carried out
"in partnership with the States, local governments, Indian tribes, and private

57. Id. § 468.
58. Id. §§ 470 to 470w-6.

59. Id. § 470(b)(4).
60. Id. § 470-471(3).
61. This Register is an expansion of the roll of National Landmarks that was
created by the Historic Sites Act of 1935. Id. § 462(b). See Wilson & Zingg, supra
note 9, at 429.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 470a (1982). The Act also requires the head of any federal
agency, prior to the expenditure of funds on any program or project, to "take into
account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object
that is included in, or eligible for inclusion in, the National Register." Id. § 470f.
63. Id. §§ 470a-470c.
64. Id. § 470i (Advisory Council on Historic Preservation). See also id. § 463
(National Park System Advisory Board).
65. Id. §§ 469a-3(b), 470a(h), 470h-3(a), 470n.
66. Id. §§ 463, 470.
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Furthermore, this statute expressly

authorizes the Secretary to make grants and loans to Native American tribes
"for the preservation of their cultural heritage."'
. In the House Report on the Amendments made to the 1966 Act in 1980,
the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee observed:
First and foremost.., the goal of historic preservation is to provide the
citizens of our nation with an understanding and appreciation of their
cultural origins and heritage. It is to foster a long-range perspective of our
human use of the land and its resources, of the development of our
communities and politics, of our technologies and arts. It is directed toward
protection and enhancement of modem remnants of our architectural and
engineering traditions-for our immediate appreciation and use-and of the
heritage information that is inherent in our prehistoric and historic
resources-which
serve to tie us to the lessons and achievements of the
69
past.

These Amendments were intended to provide even greater federal guidance
and support
to efforts made on the state and local level to preserve historical
70
sites.
The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 expressly contemplates the
preservation of artifacts discovered through archaeological projects. The Act's
emphasis is nonetheless placed on the preservation of structures. As such, this
statute does offer some protection to Native American structures such as cliff
dwellings and perhaps those religious and cultural objects that are located at
the sites of some burial grounds.
Most'Native American cultures, however, did not emphasize architecture.71 In addition, the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 contains
a religious property exclusion that makes protection of some of these sites
more difficult. 72 Therefore, the 1966 Act has significant limitations on its
protection of Native American heritage.
3. The ArchaeologicalResources ProtectionAct of 1979. In an effort to

respond to the Ninth Circuit's ruling, as well as to correct the infirmities of

67. Id. § 470-1 (emphasis added).
68. Id. § 470a(d)(3)(B).
69. H.R. REP. No. 1457, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6378, 6384.
70. Id. at 22-25, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6385-88.

71. See Wilson & Zingg, supra note 9, at 417-18.
72. See Comment, supra note 54, at 432. See also Suagee, American Indian
Religious Freedom and CulturalResources Management: ProtectingMother Earth's
Caretakers,10 AM. IND. L. REV. 1, 43 (1982); Winter, Indian HeritagePreservation
and Archaeologists,45 AM. ANTIUiTY 12,1, 124 (1980).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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the Antiquities Act of 1906, Congress enacted the Archaeological Resources
Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA).73 Although the 1906 Act was never
formally repealed, it has been largely superseded by ARPA.74
ARPA defines "archaeological resources" as "any material remains of past

human life or activities which are of archaeological interest" that are at least
one hundred years old.75 This statute clearly recognizes that
archaeological resources are diminishing resources in this nation
today. Because of this, and because... [a]rchaeological resources
are finite and non-refinable, the objective should be to manage these
resources for their long-term conservation while at the same time
allowing the necessary consumption of them in the interests of
advancing knowledge about the past or to illustrate or interpret to
the public and the human history of this nation.76

73. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47011 (1982). The House report stated:
In a 1974 decision, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that the 1906 Act was unconstitutional. The court found that

the definitional portion of the Act was unconstitutionally vague; therefore,
the Act is legally unenforceable in the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit
includes the states of Arizona, California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington,
Montana, Idaho, Alaska, Hawaii and Guam.
That court decision, coupled with the dramatic rise in recent years of
illegal excavations on public lands and Indian lands for private gain,
prompted Members of the House and Senate to introduce legislation
intended to provide adequate protection to archaeological resources located

on public lands and Indian lands.
Much has changed since the 1906 Act was passed. The commercial
value of illegally obtained artifacts has substantially increased and the
existing penalties under the 1906 Act have proven to be an inadequate
deterrent to theft of archaeological resources from public lands.
H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1709, 1710.
74. Echo-Hawk, supra note 2, at 449.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb (1982). The Act states that such materials "shall include,
but not be limited to: pottery, basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon projectiles, tools,
structures or portions of structures, pit houses, rock paintings, rock carvings, intaglios,
graves, human skeletal materials, or any portion or piece of any of the foregoing
items." Id.
76. H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1722.
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For this very reason, only individuals who possess "adequate professional
expertise""7 shall be granted permits for excavation and removal of this type
of archaeological data.78
Although the archaeological resources remain the property of the United
States, ARPA requires that they be preserved in a suitable location such as a
museum or university."
This statute has nonetheless recognized Native
American interests in archaeological sites by requiring consent from Native
American landowners before a permit will issue, 80 and providing Native
Americans with a more active role in determining who may receive permits 8
and what objects may be excavated and removed.82 Finally, the statute
contains more severe punishments for violators. Any person who knowingly
violates this law is subject to a $10,000 fine, up to one year of imprisonment,
or both the fine and imprisonment. 83

77. Id. at 9, 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1782.
78. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(b)(1) (1982).
79. Id. § 470cc(b)(3). The House report states:
The Committee intends that archaeological specimens removed be
adequately evaluated and the knowledge obtained used for scientific and
educational purposes. The subsequent storage or display of these artifacts
should not, however, be narrowly construed and may include private as well
as public museums or institutions which have adequate resources to protect
the artifacts and to provide a public, educational, or interpretive service.
H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1709, 1712.
80. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(g) (1982).
81. Id. § 470cc(g)(1), (2). This is a shift from previous policy in which the
emphasis in control over these matters was placed "upon academic expertise rather
than aboriginal ancestry." See Wilson & Zingg, supra note 9, at 426 (discussing
membership of the Advisory Board of the National Parks, Historical Sites, Buildings,
and Monuments created under the Historic Sites, Buildings, and Antiquities Act of
1935).
82. In particular, the statute is concerned about the disturbance of religious
objects. 16 U.S.C. § 470cc(c) (1982). More generally, although stressing the
importance of leadership by experts in this area,
[t]he Committee is concerned that greater efforts must be undertaken by the
Secretary and professional archaeologists to involve to the fullest extent
possible non-professional individuals with existing collections or with an
interest in archaeology .... The Committee is convinced that the key to
success of a program of this nature is true cooperation between all parties
concerned.
H.R. REP. No. 311, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprintedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1709, 1715.

83. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee(d) (1982). Recent amendments to ARPA have been made
to facilitate easier arrest, prosecution, and conviction of looters. See generally S. REP.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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4. Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960. The Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960,
which is also referred to as the Archaeological and Historical Preservation
Act, was enacted to ensure the preservation of archaeological data threatened
by the construction of dams and other public works.M In 1974, this statute
was amended to expand its application to include all federal and federally
assisted construction projects.' The Secretary of the Interior must consult
with interested federal and state agencies, educational and scientific organizations, private institutions, and qualified individuals "with a view to determining the ownership of and the most appropriate repository for any6 relics and
specimens recovered" from projects performed under this statute.s
5. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. While the National
Environmental Policy Act is primarily aimed at preventing further damage to
our natural environment,' the Congressional policy statement takes notice
of the fact that an integral part of this objective includes the federal government's responsibility to "preserve important historic, cultural, and natural
aspects of our national heritage."'
[The National Environmental Policy Act] is clearly relevant to the
preservation of Indian "sites" of cultural significance which are threatened
by agencies of the federal government. Indeed, the Act has recently been
held applicable to sustain an injunction against a highway project which
endangered a "geological Indian lookout," which the court found to be
possessed of "outstanding scenic, geological, historical and archaeological
features ....
The effect of this statute was to formally introduce the evaluation of historic
preservation as a necessary factor for comment during the environmental
impact statement process. 90
6. Department of TransportationAct. The Department of Transportation
Act declares as a part of the national policy "that special effort should be

No. 566, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS

3983, 3983-89.
84. H.R. REP. No. 1392, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE
2403, 2404.
85. H.R. REP. No. 992, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 3168, 3168-69.
86. 16 U.S.C. § 469a-3(b) (1982).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982).
88. Id. § 4331(b)(4). See Preservation Coalition, Inc. v. Pierce, 667 F.2d 851 (9th
Cir. 1982).
89. Wilson & Zingg, supra note 9, at 435 (citing Indian Lookout Alliance v.
Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), modified, 484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973)).
90. Wilson & Zingg, supra note 9, at 435-36.
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made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and
recreation lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites." 9
Consequently, the Secretary of Transportation has been prohibited from
approving any program or project that would involve the use of any land
containing a historic site, as determined by federal, state, or local officials,
unless there is no feasible and prudent alternative and everything possible has
been done to minimize the harm to the historic site in question.' In an
attempt to comply with the policy objectives of both this Act and the National
Historical Preservation Act,93 the Department of Transportation has promulgated an "archaeological regulation" which permits the recovery of archaeological
material at places designated as historic sites under the meaning of either
act.94 This regulation permits the Department to work with state and local
officials to develop a retrieval plan when the archaeological materials are
made more valuable through recovery.95
Generally, the federal legislation previously discussed has its primary
impact on those objects that will be excavated in the future. While encouraging involvement by Native Americans and demonstrating sensitivity to Native
American concerns, these statutes, as well as countless others, 1 clearly
manifest a Congressional policy that first and foremost seeks to ensure the
protection and preservation of the archaeological record that makes up
America's heritage.97

91. 23 U.S.C. § 138; 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982 & Supp. 1985).

92. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
At least one commentator has determined that administrative and judicial interpretation
has severely weakened the strength of this requirement. Note, Road Through Our
Ruins: Archaeology and Section 4(0 of the Department ofTransportationAct, 28 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 155, 156 (1986).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 45-63.
94. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(e) (1984). See also 45 Fed. Reg. 71,976 (1980).
95. Town of Belmont v. Dole, 766 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.

1055 (1986).
96. It is worth noting that there have been some well-publicized prosecutions for
international theft of cultural objects under the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2314-2315 (1982). See United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Hollinshead, 495 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1974). The same action could
possibly be taken under 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (1982) against individuals alleged to have
improperly taken Native American religious and cultural objects and human remains.
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribe v. Beard, 554 F. Supp. 1, 4 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (Native
American tribes have implied private cause of action for damages for violation of this
statute). But see Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir.
1989) (statute does not give rise to a private cause of action).
97. See Palacios & Johnson, supra note 21, at 720.
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B. State Statutes
For the purposes 6f this discussion, state statutes relating to this subject
can be divided into three basic categories: (1) statutes generally concerned
with cemeteries and dead bodies; (2) archaeological and historic preservation
laws; and (3) legislation expressly dealing with Native American skeletal
remains and religious and cultural objects. 9s
1. Cemeteries and Dead Bodies. Although burial sites have traditionally
enjoyed protection at common law, 99 every state in the nation has nonetheless considered it necessary to enact extensive legislation regulating dead
It has been evident, however, that the
bodies1°° and cemeteries.'
protections embodied in the common law and codified by these state statutes

98. Higginbotham, NativeAmericans VersusArchaeologists:The LegalIssues, 10
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 91, 111-13 (1982).
99. P. Jackson, supra note 33, at 186.
100. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-803 to -862 (1986); AK. STAT.
ANN. § 5-60-101 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 12-34-101 to -209 (1985 & Supp.
1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 3151-3169 (1983 & Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. §§
245.06-.16 (1988 & Supp. 1990); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-1 to -99 (1989 & Supp.
1989); HA. REV. STAT. §§ 338-23 to -25.6 (1985); Mo. REV. STAT. § 194.005 (1979);
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 23-06-01 to -06-30 (1978 & Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 34-25-18 to -25-52 (1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32.1-277 to -1-309 (1985 &
Supp. 1990).
101. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 11-17-1 to -17-16 (1989 & Supp. 1990); ALASKA
STAT. §§ 10.30.010-.155 (1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2194 (1986); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 12-12-101 to -12-115 (1985 & Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 19a-295 to -315 (West 1986 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. §§ 497.001-.091 (1988 &
Supp. 1990); Aw. REV. STAT. §§ 441-1 to -46 (1985 & Supp. 1989); IDAHO CODE
§§ 27-101 to -128 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 34, paras. 1-66 (1972 & Supp. 1990);
IND. CODE §§ 23-14-1-1 to -14-1-29 (1989 & Supp. 1990); IOWA CODE §§ 566.1-.27
(1950 & Supp. 1990); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1401 to -1441, 17-1302 to -1370 (1982

& Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8:1-:901 (1986 & Supp. 1990); MNE. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 901-1341 (1981); MIcH. COMP. LAws §§ 21.820-.936 (1983 &
Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. §§ 306.01-.88, 307.01-.11 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Miss.
CODE ANN. §§ 41-43-1 to -43-53 (1981 & Supp. 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 214.010.410 (1983 & Supp. 1990); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 12-101 to -1121 (1987); N.J. REV.
STAT. §§ 8A:1-1 to 12-6 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 1-19 (Purdon 1965 & Supp.

1990); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 46-1-101 to -6-104 (1987); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 912a-1 to 930a-1 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-1 to 1-24 (1986 & Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5301-5579 (1987); VA. CODE

ANN. §§ 57-22 to -39.19 (1986 & Supp. 1990); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 68.04.010.48.090 (1985 & Supp. 1990); W. VA. CODE §§ 35-5-1 to -5-6 (1985 & Supp. 1990);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -8-407 (1988).
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have not always been afforded to Native American burial sites. It has been
suggested that this unequal protection may be due to the fact that
"cemetery" is usually defined in Judeo-Christian terms-i.e., several burials
in the same location with visible grave markers. Indian burials are usually
not grouped in one well-marked location; rather, they often occur in
individual locations which are sometime "marked" by natural formations or
preserved in oral tradition, and sometimes not marked or remembered at all.
Because Indian burials do not usually conform to the Judeo-Christian
model, they are not usually granted statutory protection under the definition
of a cemetery. Further, because many tribes have been forced to evacuate
their ancestral lands by the United States Government, many burial
locations that may have been considered a "cemetery" have been constructively abandoned. 02
Cultural differences and unduly literal interpretation of these laws may indeed
account in part for the absence of protection for Native American graves in
the past. It must be recognized, however, that many of these burial sites were
disturbed at a time when Native Americans simply were not treated with the
same dignity, respect, and consideration as other Americans.' 0 3
Recently, courts have become more sensitive to the disturbance of Native
American burial sites.'04 In addition, many states have enacted laws
protecting nontraditional cemeteries.'0 5 For example, Missouri recently
enacted legislation protecting unmarked burial sites. 6 This law applies
"[w]hen an unmarked human burial or human burial remains are encountered

102. Bowman, supra note 17, at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
103. The most infamous, but by no means the only improper, collection of Native
American human remains began in 1896. In that year, the Surgeon General ordered
the United States Army to form a collection of Native American craniums. The
purpose of the collection was allegedly to aid anthropological science by obtaining the
measurements of a large number of skulls of the aboriginal races of North America.
Over the next forty years, often through highly unethical and disrespectful means, the
Army collected nearly 5,000 Native American skulls and skeletal parts. Much of this
collection currently resides in the custody of the Smithsonian Institution. See supra
text accompanying note 15.
104. See, e.g., State v. Cochran, 69 Ore. App. 132, 683 P.2d 1038 (1984); Indiana
State Highway Patrol Comm'n v. Ziliak, 428 N.E.2d 275 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); State
v. Turley, 96 N.M. 592, 633 P.2d 700 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
105. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 872.05 (West Supp. 1990); MAss. GEN. LAWS

ANN. ch. 7, § 38A; ch. 9, §§ 26A, 27C; ch. 38, § 6B; ch. 114, § 17 (West 1986);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 307.08 (West Supp. 1990); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 194.400-.410
(Supp. 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 70-26 to -40 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 227-

C:8 (1989).
106. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 194.400 (Supp. 1989).
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during archaeological excavation, construction, or other ground disturbing
activities, whether found on or in any private lands or waters or on or in any
lands or waters owned by the state."1" 7 Any person who discovers an
unmarked burial site or human remains is bound to report the finding to the
state historic preservation officer.'O' That state official is then responsible
for determining: (1) whether disinterment is necessary and appropriate for the
purpose of scientific analysis;"° and (2) whether there are any descendants
or people with an ethnic affinity with whom the official might counsel in
determining the proper disposition of the remains." 0 Violation of this
statute constitutes a criminal misdemeanor."'
2. Archaeology and Historic Preservation. Individual states, like the
federal government, have demonstrated great concern and commitment to the
preservation of America's heritage. Indeed, many of the states have enacted
legislation that is very similar to the federal archaeological and historical
preservation statutes previously discussedY" For instance, many of the
archaeological resources protection acts require that a permit be issued prior
to excavation and removal of objects from public landsY.3 Many of these

107. Id. § 194.405.
108. Id. § 194.406.
109. Id. § 194.407(1).
110. Id. § 194.408(1)-(2).
111. Id. § 194.410.
112. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 41.35.010-.35.240 (1988); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 41-841 to -847 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-80-401 to -80-410 (1988);
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 267.011-.17 (West 1975 & Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 6E1 to -16 (1985 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 127, para. 133d1-15 (Smith-Hurd
1981 & Supp. 1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-3.4-1 to .4-12 (Bums 1987); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 164.705-.735 (Michie 1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41:1601-1614
(West 1990); MNE. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 371-378 (1988); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§ 2-301 to -310 (1989); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 39-7-1 to -7-41 (1973 & Supp.
1989); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3-421 to -3-442 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
383.011-.190 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 227-C:1 to -C:17 (1989); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 18-6-1 to -6-21 (1987 & Supp. 1989); N.Y. PUB. BLDGs. LAw §§ 60-64
(McKinney Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 358.905-.955 (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§
42-45.1-1 to .1-13 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 11-6-101 to -6-115 (1987 & Supp.
1989); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 191.001-.174 (Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1990);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-18-18 to -18-35 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 761-767
(1987); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-2300 to -2306 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§
27.53.010-.53.901 (1982 & Supp. 1990); W.VA. CODE § 29-1-7 (1986); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 44.30-.48 (West Supp. 1989); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-1-114 to -1-116
(1977).
113. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.080 (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41842 (1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-80-406 (1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.12 (West
1975 & Supp. 1990); KY. REV. STAT. § 164-720 (Michie 1987); MNE. REV. STAT.
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statutes also provide expressly that all archaeological resources recovered from
state land are state property." 4 At the same time, state legislation seems to
differ from the federal statutes in the states' heightened sensitivity to the
concerns of Native Americans. For example, some states have gone so far as
to require the reinterment of all Native American remains uncovered on either
public or private lands.1
3. Native American Protection Laws. Many states have gone much
further than the federal government by enacting statutes specifically aimed at
protecting Native American burial sites and objects. 6 In Wana the Bear
v. Community Construction, Inc.," 7 the California Court of Appeals held
that a Native American burial ground did not merit protected status as a public
cemetery under the state's existing cemetery statute because the particular
Native American group was no longer using the burial site at the time the
state law was enacted."' In response to this ruling, legislation was enacted
for the express purpose of protecting Native American burial sites." 9 This
law provides that whenever a property owner discovers what he believes to be
Native American skeletal remains on his land, he is required to promptly
notify the Native American Heritage Commission. The Commission in turn
is obligated to contact the group or tribe it believes to be descendants of the

ANN. tit. 27, § 374 (1988); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 2-305 (1989); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 138.36 (West 1979); MIss. CODE ANN. § 39-7-19 (Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 22-3-432 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 227-C:7 (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 70-13(b) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-20-31 to -20-32 (1985); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 11-6-105 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18-25 (1986); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 764 (1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-2302 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 44.47

(4) (West Supp. 1989).
114. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.020 (1988); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-80-401
(1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:1605 (West Supp. 1990); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 2-309 (1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.37 (West 1979); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 227-C:8-b (1989); N.M. STAT. §18-6-9 (1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 70-13(b)(5)
(1985); R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-45.1-4 (1988); TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-6-104 (1987).
115. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 305A.7 (West 1988); MNE. REV. STAT. ANN.

tit. 22, § 4720 (1980).
116. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 41-3-1 to -3-6 (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§
5301-5306 (1983); IDAHO CODE §§ 27-501 to -504 (Supp. 1989); ILL ANN. STAT. ch.
127, para. 133cl-6 (Smith-Hurd 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1168-1168.6, tit.
53, § 361 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 27.44.010-44.901 (1985 & Supp. 1990).
117. 128 Cal. App. 3d 536, 180 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1982).
118. Id. at 541, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 426.

119. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(r) (West 1990); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7050.5 (West Supp. 1988); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5097.94, 5097.98, 5097.99
(West 1984 & Supp. 1990).
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deceased individual.120 Representatives of the appropriate tribe and the
property owner may then attempt to negotiate an agreement regarding the
disposition of the remains. If agreed to by the parties, the statute does permit
nondestructive scientific analysis of the remains.' If no agreement can be
reached, however, the property owner is required to rebury the human remains
and any grave objects associated with the burial site.2
Recently, the Nebraska legislature enacted the Unmarked Human Burial
Sites and Skeletal Remains Protection Act."
This statute was enacted
primarily as the result of an unsuccessful request submitted to the Nebraska
State Historical Society by Native Americans for the return of their ancestors'
skeletal remains. Very similar to the California legislation, this law applies
to human remains regardless of whether they are located on public or private
lands"2 and permits limited scientific analysis of the remains."2
The Nebraska statute goes further, however, and requires all institutions,
agencies, organizations, or other entities in the state which receive funding or
official recognition from the state or any of its political subdivisions to
comply promptly with all requests made by Native American descendants or
descendant tribes for the return of human remains and burial objects that are
already contained in their collections."2 All other institutions are required
to respond to these requests by providing to the claimant within ninety days
"an itemized inventory of any human skeletal remains and burial goods that
are subject to return to the requesting relative or Indian tribe.', 27 This
statute is directed at public istitutions and in no way applies to the private
collector.
If a dispute arises concerning the disposition of the human remains or any
associated funerary objects, the Nebraska statute provides that the aggrieved
party shall formally notify the adverse party of its position and, within sixty
days, the parties shall meet and attempt to resolve the dispute. 1" If this
attempt is unsuccessful, the parties shall designate a third party to assist in the
resolution of the dispute.' 29

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 5097.94(a), 5097.98(a) (West 1984).
Id. § 5097.98(a).
Id. § 5097.98(b).
1989 NEB. LAws 340.
Id. § 340:3(1).
Id. § 340:8(2).

126. Id. § 340:9.
127. Id. § 340:10.
128. Id. § 340:11.

129. Id. If the parties are unable to agree on a third party, the Public Counsel
shall automatically be designated to serve in that capacity. Id.
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Following the designation of a third party, the aggrieved party may
submit a petition, together with supporting documentation, to the third party
describing the nature of the grievance. The aggrieved party shall serve a
copy of the petition and all supporting documents on the adverse party at
the time of filing. The 'adverse party shall have thirty days to respond to
the petition by filing a response and supporting documentation with the
third party-copies of which shall be served on the aggrieved party by the
adverse party at the time of filing the response.
The third party shall review the petition, the response, all supporting
documentation submitted by the parties, and other relevant information.
Following such review and within ninety days after the filing of the
petition, the two original parties and the third party shall,
by majority vote,
130
render a decision with regard to the matter in dispute.
This procedure constitutes the aggrieved party's sole remedy."' If the
parties are not satisfied with the result, either party may appeal the decision
to the state district court for de novo review of all of the issues.3 Finally,
there is a private civil cause of action against any person alleged to have
intentionally violated this statute.
Kansas 3 and Arizona'35 have subsequently enacted equally progressive legislation.
C. Impact of Federaland State Legislation
The federal and state legislation in this area demonstrates an evolution of
attitudes and enhanced sensitivity in our society regarding the disposition of
Native American religious and cultural objects and skeletal remains. Some of
these statutes are aimed primarily at the preservation of cultural objects and
human remains for the edification of our society as a whole. Indeed, much
of the federal legislation currently in place constitutes an acknowledgement
of the significance and value of this archaeological data. These statutes
provide for the preservation and study of these objects and human remains so
that all people may benefit from the information and inspiration they yield.
The state legislation also demonstrates an awareness of the importance of
preservation and scientific study. Many state statutes reflect a trend that is
also very concerned with the protection of the rights of the relevant group or
culture. Consequently, both the views of the scientific community and the
concerns and interests of Native Americans have been heeded to some extent

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1937 (1987).
133. 1989 NEB. LAws § 12.
134. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 75-2741 to -2754 (1989).
135. ARIZ. S. 1412.
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by the legislatures of this country. The combined effect of these statutes, and
the trend they bespeak for the future, indicates that there exists very real
protection of the interests of parties on both sides of this issue concerning
future discovery of human remains, funerary objects, and religious and cultural
objects. Therefore, the issues that are yet to be addressed involve the right of
possession and ownership of objects and skeletal remains that were acquired
prior to the creation of these laws and which currently reside in public and
private museums.
IV. FREEDOM OF RELIGION
While there are possible constitutional arguments that may be made for
the transfer of control and possession of Native American skeletal remains and
objects associated with Native American cultures and religions that are
currently held in museum collections based on equal protection, 136 due
process, 137 the establishment clause, 38 and the ninth amendment, 39 the
argument most commonly raised is that retention of religious and ceremonial
objects by museums interferes with Native Americans'. rights to practice their
religion and therefore violates the free exercise clause.140
In Sherbert v. Verner, 4' a case which involved a Seventh Day Adventist
who was denied unemployment benefits because she refused to work on
Saturdays for religious reasons, the United States Supreme Court introduced
a balancing analysis which weighs the individual's right to free exercise of

136. Bowman, supra note 17, at 181-82. This argument would have particular
application to Native American skeletal remains which have been excavated from
Native American burial sites. Generally, non-Native American cemeteries have been
protected by common law and state law from desecration and disturbance. As is
apparent from the number of excavated Native American remains, Native American
burial sites have not received the same protection. See Higginbotham, supra note 90,
at 99-100.
137. Higginbotham, supra note 98, at 99-101 ("[E]qual protection applies to the
federal government by way of the due process clause of the fifth amendment."). This
argument would apply to the literally millions of Native American objects contained
in state and federal collections.
138. Bowman, supra note 17, at 180-81; Higginbotham, supra note 98, at 94-98.
See also Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
This argument, however, is usually discussed only as an additional reason to deny
protection to Native American religious practices. Bowman, supra note 17, at 181.
139. Bowman, supra note 17, at 182-84; Higginbotham, supra note 98, at 102.
140. Blair, supra note 9, at 139; Bowman, supra note 17, at 174-80; Higginbotham, supra note 98, at 98.
141. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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1 42
religious practices against the state's interests in regulating these practices.
To prevail, the state must demonstrate 143 that the regulation is necessitated
by a compelling state interest and that there are no less restrictive alternatives
available. 44 The Sherbert balancing test has been applied to Native
American religious practices. 45 In People v. Woody,'46 a case often cited
by proponents of the view that Native American religious objects and skeletal
remains should be returned based on the constitutional right of free exercise
of religious beliefs, the California Supreme Court addressed the use of peyote
in the religious ceremonies of the Native American Church. 47 In so doing,
the court weighed the state's interest in prohibiting the use of hallucinogenic
drugs against the importance of the use of peyote in the practices of the
Native American Church.' 4 The court ruled in favor of the Native Americans, stating '1[a]Ithough peyote serves as a sacramental symbol similar to
bread and wine in certain Christian churches, it is more than a sacrament.
Peyote constitutes in itself an object of worship;49prayers are directed to it
much as prayers are devoted to the Holy Ghost.'
In discussing this case, one commentator has remarked:

142. Id. at 406-09.
143. As noted by one commentator:
Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute imposes a burden on his
religious practice, this showing brings him within the purview of the first
amendment, 'and entitles his religious freedom to a "preferred position" on
the scales of the balance. This "preferred position" rebuts the normal
presumption in favor of the constitutionality of statutes. Moreover, it erects
a contrary presumption in its place-a presumption favoring religious
freedom.'
Blair, supra note 9, at 140 (quoting Breslin, Recent Developments: Statute Prohibiting
Use ofPeyote UnconstitutionalasApplied to Religious Users, 17 STAN. L. REv. 494,

498 (1965) (footnotes omitted)).
144. Sherbert,374 U.S. at 406-09. See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indian
Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972).
145. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 739-45 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176-79 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1980); Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 620
F.2d 1159, 1163-65 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980); Crow v. Gullet,
541 F. Supp. 785, 787-88, 794 (D. S.D. 1982), aff'd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983); Hopi Indian Tribe v. Block, 8 Indian L. Rep. (Am.
Indian Law Training Program) 3073, 3075 (D.D.C. 1981).
146. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) (en bane).
147. Id. at 717, 394 P.2d at 14-15, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 70-71.
148. Id. at 719-21, 394 P.2d at 816-17, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 72-73.
149. Id. at 721, 394 P.2d at 817, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 73.
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If museums were forced to relinquish a few holdings, the effect on the
community would be considerably less grave than the potential effects of
the Woody decision. No possibility of flagrant disregard of drug laws, or
a drug overdose epidemic, would exist. Therefore, it seems the state's
interests in protecting its citizens are significantly less compelling in the
Indian 0artifacts situation than in a situation such as that in the Woody
I
case.
The obvious problem with this argument is, of course, that most American
museums and collections are nongovernmental.' 5' An action for violation
of the first amendment in this context would only lie with the existence of
state action.uz
This same commentator has gone on to argue that the American Indian
Religious Freedom Act' 5 3 might be interpreted to require, the return of
religious objects.5
Specifically, this Act declares a federal policy to
preserve and protect "for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to
believe, express, and exercise the[ir] traditional religions... including but not
limited to access to sites, [and] use and possession of sacred objects."'' 5
Even if this statute does not compel the return of religious objects or human
remains, it has been suggested that the federal government can withhold
funding and remove tax exemptions from museums that refuse to return sacred
objects to which Native Americans have valid claims.'56
The United States Supreme Court has recently addressed most aspects of
the free exercise argument discussed above.* In Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Association,17 Native Americans sought to enjoin the
United States Forest Service from building roads through and harvesting
lumber in the Chimney Rock section of the Six Rivers National Park in

150. Blair, supra note 9, at 140.
151. Merryman, ThinkingAbout the Elgin Marbles,83 MICH. L. REV. 1881, 1893
(1985).
152. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
154. See Blair, supra note 9, at 146.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988). It is worth noting that the legislative history to
this statute focuses primarily on (1) denial of access to Native Americans of certain
physical locations, (2) prohibition of use of certain restricted substances, and (3)
interference in religious events. H.R. REP. No. 1308, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1262, 1263-64. This statute
basically requires federal agencies to consider, but not necessarily defer to, Native
American religious values. Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
156. See Blair, supra note 9, at 146.
157. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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California." 8 The opposition was generated by the fact that this area had
historically been used for religious purposes by Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa
Indians.'59 Among other reasons, the district court granted the injunction on
the ground that the Forest Service's decisions violated the free exercise
clause."6
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's
constitutional ruling on the ground that the government had failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest in the completion of the road, and that it
could have abandoned the road without thereby violating the establishment
clause.' 1 ' In considering this case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
the Forest Service's plans would significantly interfere with the Native
Americans' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own
religious beliefs.' 6 2
The Court, however, found that there was no violation of constitutional
rights because "affected individuals [are not] coerced by the Government's
action into violating their religious beliefs," nor does the Government's "action
penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights,
benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens."1' 63 The Court went on

158. Id. at 442.
159. Id.
160. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586,
591, 594-97 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affid, 795 F.2d 688 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nora,
Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
161. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 69193 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub noma, Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
162. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451. Indeed, the Court stated:
The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the
logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have
devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices. Those practices
are intimately and inextricably bound up with the unique features of the
Chimney Rock area, which is known to the Indians as the "high country."
Individual practitioners use this area for personal development; some of
their activities are believed to be critically important in advancing the
welfare of the tribe, and indeed, of mankind itself. The Indians use this
area, as they have used it for a very long time, to conduct a wide variety

of specific rituals that aim to accomplish their religious goals. According
to their beliefs, the rituals would not be efficacious if conducted at other
sites than the ones traditionally used, and too much disturbance of the
area's natural state would clearly render any meaningful continuation of
traditional practices impossible.... [W]e can assume that the threat to the
efficacy of at least some religious practices is extremely grave.

Id.
163. Id. at 449. In support of its decision, the Court cites Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693 (1986), in which two applicants for social security benefits contended that
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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to state that "[tihe crucial word in the constitutional text is 'prohibit:' 'For the
Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to
the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the
government.""'
It stressed that the right of free exercise of religion is
limited by the needs of the government to serve its citizens as a group. 65
The Court further found that the American Indian Religious Freedom Act
did not apply in this case and, in fact, "[n]o where in the law is there so much
as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable
individual rights."'66 Indeed, the Court quotes from the legislative history
of the Act which indicates that the law was simply intended to ensure that
traditional Native American religious practices would always be considered in
Congressional decision-making. 67
More recently, the Supreme Court decided Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith,'" which arose when Native
Americans were denied unemployment benefits following their termination for
peyote use during religious ceremonies. While
[i]t would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point),
that a state would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it sought

their religious beliefs prevented them from acceding to the use of a Social Security
number for their child because the use of a numerical identifier would "rob the spirit"
and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power. Id. at 696. The Court ruled
that while the "Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain
forms of governmental compulsion,. . . [it does] not demand that the Government join
in their chosen practices" by refraining from the institution of certain internal
procedures. Id. at 700.
164. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 412).
165. Id. at 453 ("Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area..
[does] not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.").
166. Id. at 455.
167. Id.
The sponsor of the bill that became [the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act], Representative Udall, called it "a sense of Congress joint
resolution," aimed at ensuring that "the basic right of the Indian people to
exercise their traditional religious practices is not infringed without a clear
decision on the part of the Congress or the administrators that such religious
practices must yield to some higher consideration." Representative Udall
emphasized that the bill would not "confer special religious rights on
Indians," would "not change any existing State or Federal law," and in fact
"has no teeth in it."
Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 21,444-21,445 (1978)).
168. 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
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to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious
reasons, or only because of the religious belief that was on display,169
the Supreme Court found that the state may prohibit peyote use so long as any,
interference with religious practices are incidental and secondary to the
otherwise legitimate purpose of the statute.170 The Court also refrained from
performing the "centrality" analysis that would permit invocation of a
compelling interest standard. 7'
The Supreme Court's decisions in Lyng and Smith demonstrate that an
argument for the return of religious objects and human remains that is based
on the constitutional or an existing federal statutory right to free exercise of
religious beliefs has little or no legal foundation.
V. LOST, STOLEN, AND ABANDONED PROPERTY
A museum or private collector may be able to prove a direct chain of title
from the original owner of an object associated with a particular Native
American group. This is an ideal situation for persons or institutions that
desire to retain possession of such objects. Where the object has been
excavated, principles of personal property may be applied to determine
ownership. In a substanital number of cases, however, the facts relating to the
acquisition of an object are not altogether clear. Furthermore, questions such
as whether the original transferring party had the authority or right to transfer
title to the object in the first place can be very complicated because the
answer may depend entirely on tribal custom and law relating to personal
property." A significant amount of personal property, particularly sacred
objects, may have been owned or possessed by the tribe as a whole and

169. Id. at 1599.
170. Id. at 1599-1602.
171. Id. at 1604.
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the 'centrality' of religious
beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest' test in the free exercise field,
than it would be for them to determine the 'importance' of ideas before
applying the 'compelling interest' test in the free speech field. What
principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's
assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith? Judging the
centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable business
of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.
Id.
172. See generallyBeaglehole, Ownershipand Inheritancein anAmericanIndian
Tribe, 20 IowA L. REV. 304 (1934); Knoepfler, Legal Status of the American Indian
and His Property, 7 IowA L. REV. 232 (1922).
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consequently cannot be transferred in any other manner but collectively. 73
Common law principles of adverse possession, laches, and estoppel may
nonetheless apply to determine the right of ownership of these objects.
1. Lost or Stolen Property:Adverse Possession. Arguably, objects that

exist in the ground must be considered part of the real property and the owner
of the land is the owner of the objects. Once the objects are excavated,
however, they must be deemed personal property just as objects that have
never been buried. Query whether this distinction is crucial since the doctrine
of adverse possession applies to personal, as well as real, property. 74 Of
course, the same elements for adverse possession are required where personal
property is involved as when the doctrine is applied to real property: "when
a party has had hostile, actual, open and notorious, exclusive and continuous
possession for the limitations period the true owner's title is extinguished, and
title vests in the adverse party."' 75 The limitations period does not start to
run or, if it has been running, shall not continue to run, if all of these elements
are not satisfied. 76 The defendant asserting title by adverse possession has'
the burden of proving the existence of each element by "clear and convincing
evidence.' 77 In cases of stolen property, where the possessor is either the
thief or has knowingly taken possession from the thief, "secret rather than
open holding will be presumed."'7"
The doctrine of adverse possession has had particular application to cases
involving lost or stolen art. 7 9 Generally, individuals who come into
possession of lost or stolen art can readily satisfy the elements of actual,

173. See F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 508-28. See also Charrier v. Bell, 496 So.
2d 601, 604 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
174. See generally R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 33-39 (2d ed.
1955); F. CHILDS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 393-429 (1914).

Virtually all states apply the doctrine of adverse possession to chattel.
175. Comment, The Recovery of Stolen Art: Of Paintings,Statues, and Statutes

of Limitations, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1122, 1142 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
176. Id. at 1142-43.
177. Id. at 1142 & n.80.
178. See R. Brown, supra note 174, at 38 & n.21. "On the other hand, in the
case of the bona fide purchaser the presumption would probably be just the reverse.
Whether the possession is open or covert will ordinarily be a question of fact for the
determination of the jury." Id. (footnotes omitted). 179. For example, the laws of some states impose a requirement that there be a
formal "demand and refusal" before a claimant's cause of action will accrue. See, e.g.,
DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987); Menzel v. List, 49 Misc. 2d 300,
267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (Sup. Ct. 1966), modified, 28 A.D.2d 516,279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1967); Atlas Assurance Co. v. Gibbs, 121 Conn. 188, 183 A. 690 (Conn.
1936).
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hostile, exclusive, and continuous possession.180 The element of open and
notorious possession may be more difficult to prove.181 In this way, Native
American cultural and religious objects existing in public and private
collections and lost or stolen art are alike: a key issue in both cases is
whether the original owners have had reasonable notice of the adverse
possession. Those pieces that are on continuous display most certainly satisfy
the requirements of open and notorious.
Objects that have been in storage
or that have only been used for research purposes, however, may not meet this
requirement."8 '
As previously stated, the statute of limitations will only run if and when
all of the elements of adverse possession exist. In the much celebrated case
84
of O'Keeffe v. Snyder,1
however, a "discovery rule" was adopted which
effectively tolls the statute of limitations even where all of the elements of
adverse possession exist. The O'Keeffe case stems from attempts by artist
Georgia O'Keefe to recover three small oil paintings that had been stolen from
her in 1946.185 Soon after the theft took place, these paintings came into the
possession of a private collector, Dr. Ulrich A. Frank, who subsequently gave
them to his son. 86 In 1973, the younger Ulrich consigned the paintings to
commercial galleries for sale and, in 1974, art dealer Barry Snyder purchased
the O'Keeffe paintings. 8 7 In the meantime, O'Keeffe had listed the
paintings with the Art Dealers Association in 1972 as having been stolen.188

180. Comment, supra note 175, at 1143.
181. Id.
182. Ward, The Georgia Grind: Can the Common Law Accommodate the
Problems of Title in the Art World, Observations on a Recent Case, 8 J. C. & U.L.
533, 548 (1982).
183. An interesting situation exists where the party in possession of an object can
satisfy the open and notorious requirement if the object has been used in the same
manner "as an average owner of similar property would use it." Comment, supra note
175, at 1143-44. This argument stems from the development of the open and
notorious element in real property law. Id. at 1143. Today, the outcome of this type
of analysis would depend on whether the average owner is a Native American or a
museum. Ironically, it may very well be that the majority of at least some categories
of Native American cultural and religious objects are now in the hands of persons
other than Native Americans and therefore the "average use" is not necessarily the
traditional use of the object in question.
184. 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
185. O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 170 N.J. Super. 75, 78, 405 A.2d 840, 841 (Super. Ct.

App. Div. 1979), rev'd, 83 N.J. 478, 416 A.2d 862 (1980).
186. Id. at 80, 405 A.2d at 842.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 79-80, 405 A.2d at 842.
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She eventually traced the art to Snyder in 1976.189 Snyder refused to return
the paintings and O'Keeffe brought a replevin action in New Jersey state
court.' 9° Snyder responded by asserting a statute of limitations defense that
was sustained by the trial court. 91 On appeal, the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court found that the trial court had erred in applying the statute of
limitations without first finding that all of the elements of adverse possession
had been established. 192
Ultimately, certification was granted by the Supreme Court of New Jersey
which subsequently held "O'Keeffe's cause of action accrued when she first
knew or reasonably should have known through the exercise of due diligence,
of the cause of action, including the identity of the possessor of the paintings."'93 The court explained its ruling as follows:
We are persuaded that the introduction of equitable considerations
through the discovery rule provides a more satisfactory response than the
doctrine of adverse possession. The discovery rule shifts the emphasis from
the conduct of the possessor to the conduct of the owner. The focus of the
inquiry will no longer be whether the possessor has met the tests of adverse
possession but whether the owner has acted with due diligence in pursuing
his or her personal property.
For example, under the discovery rule, if an artist diligently seeks the
recovery of a lost or stolen painting, but cannot find it or discover the
identity of the possessor, the statute of limitations will not begin to run.
The rule permits an artist who uses reasonable efforts to report, investigate,
94
and recover a painting to preserve the rights of title and possession.'

189. Id. at 80-81, 405 A.2d at 842.
190. Id. at 81, 405 A.2d at 842.
191. Id. at 81, 405 A.2d at 842-43. Although the trial court determined that the
"defendant has simply failed to establish several of the basic requirements of adverse
possession," it nonetheless held that O'Keeffe's cause of action accrued in 1946 and
was therefore barred by the six year limitations period. Id. at 81, 405 A.2d at 843.
The court further refused to apply a discovery rule because O'Keeffe "simply did
nothing" to secure the return of her art. Id.
192. Id. at 89, 405 A.2d at 847. "Defendant's failure of proof, according to the
trial judge, centered on the requirements of visibility and notoriety of the possession."
Id. at 84, 405 A.2d at 844. The appellate court agreed that Snyder had failed to
establish the open and notorious element necessary for adverse possession:
Display in one's home provides to the true owner no more notice of the
possessor's claim or warning of the need for timely legal action than would
its retention in a closet. Neither mode of possession is such as to afford the
true owner with a realistic opportunity to regain possession by legal action.
Id.
193. O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 493, 416 A.2d at 870.
194. Id. at 497-98, 416 A.2d at 872.
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Thus, the court simultaneously adopted a discovery rule95while abolishing the
doctrine of adverse possession as it applies to chattels.'
Although the discovery rule has enjoyed a friendly reception by a number
of commentators, 196 this standard has yet to receive widespread acceptance
by courts. 197 . A notable exception is Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church
v. Goldberg & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.,98 in which the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana interpreted Indiana law to
apply a discovery rule similar to the rule pronounced in O'Keeffe.' 99
This suit was brought by church and government officials of Cyprus who
sought the return of Byzantine mosaics that had been unlawfully removed
from Cyprus during the Turkish military occupation. 2' The court noted that
the "[d]etermination of due diligence is fact-sensitive and must be made on a
case-by-case basis." 201 In Autocephalous, Cyprus officials provided exhaustive notice to international art organizations and worked extensively through
diplomatic channels once they became aware the mosaics had been removed.' °2 Upon receiving information that the mosaics had been acquired
by an art dealer and were in Indianapolis, the officials took immediate steps
to recover the art.203 The court determined that these efforts constituted due
diligence sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. 2" The court went on
to find that the art dealer who purchased the mosaics should have been alerted
by the suspicious circumstances surrounding the transaction and should have
made additional inquiry into the background of the art, and therefore
determined that the dealer did not qualify as a bona fide or good faith
purchaser.0 5
195. Id. at 499, 416 A.2d at 873.
196. See, e.g., Franzese, "Georgia on My Mind"-Reflections on O'Keeffe v.
Snyder, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 22 (1989); Comment, supra note 175, at 1149-57;
Ward, supra note 182, at 553-54; but see Wertheimer, Implications of the O'Keeffe
Case, 6 ART & L. 44, 47-48 (1981). See also Note, Title Disputes in the Art Market:
An Emerging Duty of Carefor Art Merchants, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1983);
Survey, PersonalProperty-AdversePossession-InAction for Replevin of a Chattel,
"DiscoveryRule," Not Doctrine of Adverse Possession,Determines When Cause of
Action Accrued for Purpose of Statute of Limitations, 11 SETON HALL L. REV. 347
(1980).
197. See Franzese, supra note 196, at 14-15 & nn. 111-13.
198. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
199. Id. at 1386, 1388-91.
200. Id. at 1376-85.
201. Id. at 1389.
202. Id. at 1379-80.
203. Id. at 1383-85.
204. Id. at 1389-91.
205. Id. at 1400-04 (applying Swiss law).
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If other states were to adopt the discovery rule, particularly if it were
accompanied by the separate decision to abolish the doctrine of adverse
possession as it applies to chattels as was done in O'Keeffe, this would create
obvious problems in situations where museum ownership of Native American
religious and cultural objects might otherwise be founded on a theory of
adverse possession. While even O'Keeffe herself has conceded that "public
display should be sufficient to alert the true owner and start the statute
running,, 2 06 itisless clear as to what might constitute due diligence with
respect to objects that have not been on display. Furthermore, it may be
relevant to consider whether the Native American individual or group should
be held to the same level of due diligence as artists and art dealers.
Even where museums are able to satisfy all of the necessary elements, the
doctrine of adverse possession may have no application to determine
ownership of objects excavated from Indian lands. Under certain circumstances, state statutes of limitations do not apply to Native Americans:
Most Indian lands are held in trust by the United States for tribes or
individual Indians. The United States holds "naked legal title" and the
Indian landowners hold beneficial title. Indians have compensable property
rights to mineral and timber resources on their trust lands, absent contrary
indications in statute or treaty. In the same manner, historic properties,
particularly archaeological resources, are attached to the land and belong to
the landowner. As a result, Indian landowners hold beneficial title to, and
"own," archaeological.resources on their lands.207
The tUnited States is obviously not barred in protecting its property interests
by state limitation periods. Because they are generally viewed as wards of the
federal government, this same nonapplication of state statutes of limitations
has generally been extended to Native Americans.20 Thus, it may be
argued that the doctrines of estoppel, laches, and adverse possession may
never be applied to objects associated with Native American cultures alleged
to have been stolen or improperly transferred.
This argument is founded on the fundamental concept of Native American
law that these doctrines can never be used to obtain title to restricted Indian
land.2°9 As stated previously, there is certain land that is held in trust by the

206. O'Keeffe, 83 N.J. at 496, 416 A.2d at 871. See also O'Keeffe v. Snyder,
170 N.J. Super. 75, 87, 405 A.2d 840, 845-46 (1979).
207. Comment, supra note 54, at 433 (footnotes omitted).
208. See U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 641 & n.7 (1958). See
also County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 240 n.13 (1985)
("Under the Supremacy Clause, state-law time bars, e.g., adverse possession and
laches, do not apply of their own force to Indian land title claims.").
209. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985);
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United States for the benefit of certain Native American tribes, families, or
individuals. 210 Alienation of this land is restricted in that the Native
American beneficiaries may not transfer the property without the permission
of the federal authority. Thus, the doctrines of laches, estoppel, and adverse
possession may not apply since: (1) these doctrines simply do not apply to
the sovereign federal authority under any circumstances; 211 and (2) these
doctrines are precluded by the federal statute which prohibits transfer of these
lands without federal consent.212
While there are numerous cases which hold that the doctrine of adverse
possession does not apply to restricted Indian land, there is no question that
this doctrine does apply to real property that Native Americans hold in
In drawing an analogy, objects previously owned by Native
fee.213
Americans are similar to land that is owned by Native Americans in fee and
that is completely alienable. While it may have a responsibility and an
interest to protect Native American property rights, the federal government
cannot be said to have an independent, or even a joint interest in these
religious or cultural objects except in cases where it has statutorily acquired
the property. Unlike the property that is subject to the Indian Nonintercourse

Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Ewert v. Bluejacket,
259 U.S. 129 (1922); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); Mohegan Tribe
v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Schwarz, 460 F.2d 1365
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); United States v. Consolidated
Mines & Smelting Co., 455 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1971); Cayuga Indian Nation v. Cuomo,
565 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Schaghticoke Tribe of Indians v. Kent School
Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn. 1976); Narragansett Tribe of Indians v. Southern
R. I. Land Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D. R.I. 1976); United States v. Russell, 261
F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Okla. 1966).
210. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
211. See United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926); United States v.
Russell, 261 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Okla. 1966).
212. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982).
213. See, e.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 671 (1979); Oregon
v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 377 (1977); Larkin v. Paugh, 276 U.S.
431, 439 (1928); Dillon v. Antler Land Co., 507 F.2d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1974); Fife
v. Barnard, 186 F.2d 655, 661-62 (10th Cir. 1951); Dennison v. Topeka Chambers
Indus. Dev. Corp., 527 F. Supp. 611, 623 (D. Kan. 1981); United States v. Wilson,
523 F. Supp. 874, 897-98 (N.D. Iowa 1981); United States v. Wilcox, 258 F. Supp.
944, 947-48 (N.D. Iowa 1966). Thus, describing Native Americans as "wards" of the
federal government is actually a misnomer because they are in fact responsible for
their transactions when they are legally able to enter into those transactions. Native
Americans are wards only in that they do not enjoy ownership of certain property in
fee.
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Act or the General Allotment Act, 2 14 there is no federal statute that expressly
prohibits the transfer of these objects without consent from the United
States.215 Thus, there is no restriction on the alienation of this type of
property by Native Americans. Because Native Americans would not be
considered wards of the Government for these purposes, the common law and
state law codification of the doctrine of adverse possession would apply to
Native American religious and cultural objects.216
2. Abandoned Property. American property law generally vests
ownership of all objects found on private property in the property owner.217
Abandoned property can generally be defined as property to which the owner
has voluntarily and intentionally relinquished all right, title, claim, and
possession without vesting it in any other person.21 8 Abandoned property

214. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
215. Religious and cultural objects are distinguishable from personal property that
may be subject to federal restraint such as tribal funds and securities. F. COHEN, supra
note 1, at 547-62.
216. Even if the doctrine of adverse possession did not apply to Native Americans
on a general basis, there might be specific circumstances where the doctrine of adverse
possession would nonetheless apply. For instance, any action currently brought on
behalf of a recognized "tribe, band or group of American Indians" against the United
States must be brought within six years and ninety days after the right of action
accrues. 28 U.S.C. § 2415(b) (Supp. 1986). Because all "artifacts" that are excavated
under the Archaeological Resources Protection Act are considered the property of the
United States, see supra text accompanying notes 60-70, a claim for return based on
conversion of personal property must be made within the above-stated limitations
period. Furthermore, some institutions such as the Smithsonian Institution may have
a sufficient link with the federal government to enjoy the protection of this federal
statute of limitations. Finally, it must be noted that as a general rule, when no federal
statutes of limitations exists for a federal claim, the courts borrow the appropriate state
limitations period. Such an action, however, must not conflict with congressional
policy. Comment, South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe: Terminating Federal
Protection With "Plain"Statements, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1117, 1123 (1987). Although
there is a general congressional policy to preserve tribal claims, exceptions are made
when federal legislation explicitly provides otherwise. See Wilson & Zingg, supra
note 9, at 439. It could be argued that the federal preservation statutes discussed
previously constitute an expressly stated congressional policy that would warrant such
an exception to this general principle. See supra text accompanying notes 39-88.
217. See Blair, supra note 9, at 131; Echo-Hawk, supra note 2, at 445; Zingg &
Wilson, supra note 9, at 421. Such objects could include skeletal remains, funerary
goods, and most other cultural objects located within private property. See EchoHawk, supra note 2, at 445.
218. It will suffice if the abandoning party is not concerned about who gains
possession of the property. Katsaris v. United States, 684 F.2d 758, 762 (11th Cir.
1982).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

37

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 4 [1990], Art. 2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

belongs to the finder. Abandoned property is thus distinguishable from lost
property in that with lost property the finder is a gratuitous bailor who has
title against all others, including the owner of the land upon which the
property is found, except the true owner.21 9 On the other hand, the owner
of the land upon which mislaid property is found has the right of possession
superior to all others but the true owner. 220 In both cases, the owner of
either the lost or mislaid property retains constructive possession as well as
legal title. 221 Once property has been abandoned, however, the owner has
completely divested himself of title and cannot reacquire possession. Because
the law favors title, the burden is on the finder to prove that the property has
been abandoned. 22
In Charrier v. Bell,m a self-styled "amateur archeologist" instituted an
action in Louisiana state court to quiet title of certain Native American objects-primarily funerary objects-that he had excavated from the site of an
ancient Tunica Indian village arguing that the objects had been abandoned. 224 The trial court found that under state law burial objects were not
encompassed in the legal concept of abandonment and further determined that
plaintiff was not entitled to relief under a theory of unjust enrichment. 2z
On review, the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's determination. At
the outset, the court held "[d]espite the fact that the Tunicas have not
produced a perfect 'chain of title' back to those buried at Trudeau Plantation,
the tribe is an accumulation of the descendants of former Tunica Indians and
has adequately satisfied the proof of descent." 226 The court then went on to
find that the objects had not been abandoned: "Objects may be buried with a
decedent for a number of reasons. The relinquishment of possession normally
serves some spiritual, moral, or religious purpose of the descendent/owner, but
is not intended as a means of relinquishing ownership to a stranger." 227 The
court further denied plaintiff's theory for recovery based on unjust enrichment,
noting that rather than creating enrichment the excavation of the objects
caused substantial upset of the Native Americans' ancestral burial
grounds.Y

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

R. BROWN, supra note 174, at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 8-9.
496 So.2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
Id. at 603.
Id.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 606.
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In evaluating the precedential value of Charrier,it must be recognized
that the court was interpreting Louisiana law which is derived from French,
rather than English, traditions. Furthermore, there was no discussion of
adverse possession. 229 Finally, the court's analysis of abandoned property
primarily focused on the funerary objects. Obviously, non-funerary objects are
more likely to fit the qualifications for abandoned property. As the court
stated in Charrier,"[t]he intent in interring objects with the deceased is that
they will remain there perpetually, and not that they are available for someone
to recover and possess as owner."" 0 Abandonment is nonetheless a difficult
theory upon which to establish the right of possession of human remains and
funerary objects removed from a burial site. It is difficult to argue that burial
indicates an intent to abandon. At the same time, there have been instances
where state courts have found that burial sites are not protected under the law
by virtue of abandonment."' In any event, the doctrine of abandonment
would be an appropriate foundation upon which to assert title over religious
and cultural objects other than funerary objects. It would certainly be more
reasonable to argue that the circumstances surrounding the discovery of such
objects are more susceptible to indicating the intent of the owner to abandon
the property.
VI. THE ARGUMENT FROM CULTURAL NATIONALISM

It might be argued that a recognized Native American tribe is virtully a
sovereign nation and therefore should be treated as such when it requests the
return of cultural or religious objects associated with its culture. Native
American tribes are not, however, sovereign nations in the broad sense of that
term. They are instead "domestic dependent nations." 2 As such, they are
subject to federal 2 3 and some state law.2 4 Thus, there is a significant
distinction between the possession of Native American objects and the

229. See id. at 604 n.3.
230. Id. at 605.
231. See, e.g., Wana the Bear v. Community Constr., Inc., 128 Cal. App. 3d 536,
541, 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 426 (1982). Following Wana, it was necessary for the
California state legislature to enact legislation for the protection of the Native
American burial site in question. See text accompanying notes 108-13.
232. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 2 (1831). See generally
Note, The American Indian-TribalSovereignty and Civil Rights, 51 IOWA L. REV.

654 (1966).
233. See generally F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 207-28.
234. See generally id. at 259-79. In essence, Native American tribes or nations
are subject to the laws of a state to the extent that they have relinquished certain rights

through treaty. Id.
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possession of cultural objects associated with the culture of a foreign
nation.' 5 The federal government has the authority and, as exemplified by
the federal legislation discussed in Part IIIA, federal law has established a
clear policy to preserve archaeological resources that makes up America's
past. 6 Because the United States is a multicultural nation, the United
States' collective past includes Native American cultures. An issue arises,
however, regarding whether Native Americans have an exclusive right to
determine whether and how objects associated with their cultures should be
treated and, indeed, whether those objects should be preserved.
Most broadly stated, the question is: do the people to whose culture the
objects are most directly linked or' associated have a superior right to
possession and ownership of those objects? Those who would respond
affirmatively to this question are said to represent "the argument from cultural
nationalism." 7 This argument is "more of an assertion than a reason" for
the return of cultural treasures:
It is not self-evident that something made in a place belongs there, or that
something produced by artists of an earlier time ought to remain in or be
returned to the territory occupied by their cultural descendants, or that the
present government of a nation should have the power over artifacts
historically associated with its people or territory.238
The argument for cultural nationalism is stronger where museums have
misrepresented the origin of the objecis or have a policy which results in
unequal access.23 9 Such museums would fail in their mission to perform

235. There are a number of professional ethical standards, federal laws, treaties,
and international compacts that protect cultural objects from international theft and
ensure the return of cultural objects to the proper country. See Malaro, supra note 23,
at 2-6.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 47-97.
237. Merryman, supra note 151, at 1911-12.
238. Id. at 1912 (footnote omitted).
239. Id. at 1913. Professor Merryfian continues:
In its truest sense, cultural nationalism is based on the relation between
cultural property and cultural definition. For a full life and a secure
identity, people need exposure to their history, much of which is represented or illustrated by objects. Such artifacts are important to cultural
definition and expression, to shared identity and community. They tell who
they are and where they come from. In helping to preserve the identity' of
specific cultures, they help the world preserve texture and diversity. Works
of art civilize and enrich life. They generate art (it is a truism among art
historians that art comes from art) and nourishes artists. Cultural property
stimulates learning and scholarship. A people deprived of its artifacts is
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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research and to accurately educate the public about the different cultures of
the world. Most museums, however, strive for authenticity. Their purpose in
the preservation, maintenance, and exhibition of the objects is to promote
appreciation, admiration and respect for the various cultures and peoples
represented in their 'collections. In contrast, the private collector has no
mission or professional responsibility to educate the public and raise the level
of respect and understanding of other cultures. Furthermore, a public museum
generally achieves its mission by making the objects accessible to the
members of the culture or nation from whom the objects originated. Cultural
deprivation generally does not occur when the object resides in the collections
of a responsible public museum.240 In contrast, the private collector makes
the object completely inaccessible.
The economic argument for cultural nationalism-that certain objects
"would command an enormous price if offered for sale, and their presence in
a public collection nourishes the tourist industry"-generally detracts from the
overall moral spirit of this argument by relating fundamentally to the trappings
of ownership rights under property law. 241 The political argument offered
in support of this position is, of course, nationalism. This argument is also
unpersuasive:
No candid observer can deny its power in world affairs. But if one sees it
as at best a dubious good, with large elements of superstition and prejudice,
with an unsavory record as the religion of the state, and as a source of
international economic, social, political, and armed conflict,242then the
nationalist argument becomes an uncomfortable one to sustain.
While perhaps not an independent sovereign under law, Native American
tribes may argue that they are independent nations in a cultural sense and
assert the argument of cultural nationalism in support of their claims for the
return of Native American religious and cultural objects and human remains.
If there is an instinctive appeal to this argument generally,243 that appeal is
intensified in light of the unfair treatment that Native Americans have received

culturally impoverished.
Id. at 1912-13.
240. Id. Professor Merryman admits that cultural nationalism has a certain
amount of instinctive appeal. In it most radical sense, anything short of actual
possession amounts to cultural deprivation. In acknowledging the "mystical element"
of cultural nationalism, Merryman states that "[w]e can respect such beliefs; and
recognize their self-fulfilling tendencies, without accepting them as a basis for the
international allocation of cultural property." Id.
241. Id. at 1914.
242. Id. at 1915.
243. See supra note 240.
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by this nation and by the questionable manner in which many Native
American objects and skeletal remains were collected.244 This argument is
particularly compelling in cases involving objects "actively employed for the
245
religious or ceremonial or communal purposes for which it was made."
The removal of these objects from centralized locations where research can be
maximized, however, would severely decrease the overall accessibility of these
important cultural objects. This would be highly unacceptable for many
interested parties because Native American cultures, despite the assimilationist
policies of the past, have become very important components of America's
heritage. Rather than being paternalistic, the argument against cultural
nationalism is as self-serving as the argument for cultural nationalism.
Therefore, the solution rests on the fair balancing of the competing scientific
and cultural interests of the parties who seek possession of these objects.
VII. NATIVE AMERICAN MUSEUM CLAIMS COMMISSION
At the present time, there are few reported cases that relate to efforts made
by Native Americans to secure the return of human remains and cultural and
religious objects. Thus, it is difficult to determine where jurisdiction would
reside in such actions. There are, however, a few circumstances in which
jurisdiction is a settled matter. A quiet title action involving objects recovered
from private property would properly be brought in state court.246 On the
other hand, where a tribe's claim of ownership of an object possessed by
someone other than a Native American is based on tribal law or custom,
federal courts may very well have jurisdiction to hear the claim.247

244. We must rectify this awful record in the future by pledging, among other
things, to provide Native Americans with assistance in the preservation of their
heritage. However, it would be inconsistent to argue that this obligation must include
the indiscriminate return of Native American objects and human remains. Rather than
preservation, this would very likely lead to the destruction of these objects either
because the recipient Native American groups do not have the proper facilities and
resources necessary to preserve the objects or because the objects will be subjected to
ceremonial use which would result in deterioration.
245. Merryman, The Retention of CulturalProperty,21 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 477,
497 (1988).
246. Charrier v. Bell, 496 So. 2d 601 (La. Ct. App. 1986).

247. Chilkat Indian Village v. Johnson, 870 F.2d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1989). It
must nonetheless be noted, however, that there is exclusive tribal jurisdiction over
actions involving contracts entered into on a reservation between a plaintiff who is not
a Native American and an Native American defendant. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959).
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Recently, legislation has been proposed in the Senate for the creation of
a Native American Museum Claims Commission. 24 8 Although this proposed
legislation was not enacted, it is nonetheless a useful example of a method to
resolve these issues. This five member body would have had authority to
resolve disputes between public museums and Native Americans concerning
the ownership of three categories of objects: (1) human remains; (2)
ceremonial objects; and (3) funerary objects.249 The Commission would
conduct investigations, hold hearings, and ultimately have the authority to
issue orders of repatriation.'"
Review of Commission rulings could be
sought in federal district court?2' The Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs has stated that this proposed legislation
is based upon an assumption that there is a compelling need for federal
legislation to establish an efficient and fair process to consider Native
American claims to human skeletal remains, grave goods and ceremonial
religious objects held in museum collections. The purpose of the legislation
is to facilitate the repatriation of such items when the facts substantiate that
the items
were acquired without the consent of affected Native Ameri2
cans.
In particular, "[t]he Committee believes that the Federal government has an
obligation to rectify this past injustice to Native Americans by creiting the
opportunity for [human] remains5 3to be returned to the tribes and descendants
for proper and fitting reburial."
There were a number of problems with this proposed legislation. A
significant concern relates to the constitutional issue of whether the legislation
constitutes a taking of property that would require the payment of just

248. S. 187, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1988).

249. SENATE SELEcT COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, ESTABLISHING THE NATIVE
AMERICAN MUSEUM CLAIMS COMMISSION, S. REP. No. 601, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1988) [hereinafter Senate Report on Native American Museum Claims Commission].
250. S.187, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 10, 13, 14, 17 (1988). "The proposed
Native American [Museum] Claims Commission which would be created by S. 187
is based upon the model of the former Indian Claims Commission which functioned
for over 20 years to investigate and resolve land claims between tribes and nonIndians." Senate Report on Native American Museum Claims Commission, supra note
249, at 2.
251. S.187, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 24 (1988).
252. Senate Report on American Indian Museum Claims Commission, supra note
249, at 2.
253. Id. at 4.
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compensation. While the proposed legislation may guarantee a degree of due
process by requiring the Commission to hold hearings "to provide both parties
to a dispute the opportunity to present their views,",254 a question exists

whether Congress can enact such a deprivation of property rights without just
compensation 55 Furthermore, without regard for whether the objects are
stolen or otherwise acquired improperly, this proposed legislation would
radically alter traditional principles of property law by shifting the burden of
proof from the party seeking the return of the personal property to the
possessor of the property2 6
Concerns relating to equal protection also exist due to the unequal
treatment of museums, which are compelled to surrender religious and cultural
objects and human remains, and private collectors, who are permitted to retain
these objects. 7 While museums may not be a protected class entitled to
a strict scrutiny analysis, it is difficult to perceive the rational relationship with
a legitimate governmental purpose to justify depriving museums but not
private collectors of objects associated with Native American cultures and
peoples. The absence of a rational relationship is particularly apparent
considering the fact that private collectors, who would be beyond the
jurisdiction of the Commission, are more likely to deprive Native Americans
of all accessibility to their cultural objects. Of course, it would be difficult for
public museums, an unprotected class, to prevail on an equal protection
argument.
There is substantial confusion, even on the part of the Committee itself,
as to what law-American law, common law, or tribal law-should be applied
by the Commission in adjudicating these ownership disputes between Native
Americans and museums.5 8 This confusion is intensified by the fact that

254. Id. at 1.
255. See Andrus v. Allard 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (distinction between federal
regulation that merely curtails some property uses and that which compels surrender
of artifacts).
256. See generally R. BROWN, supra note 174, at 33-39; F. CHILDS, supra note
174, at 393-429.
257. S. 187, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(5), 9(d) (1988).
258. With respect to human remains and funerary objects, the Committee has
stated its belief that
tribes should be able to claim skeletal remains which are clearly identified
as the members or ancestors of the tribe, unless the museum can clearly
demonstrate that the remains were acquired with the permission of the tribe,
family or individual descendent involved. The Committee does not believe
that tribes should be able to claim skeletal remains when identification by
tribal affiliation is unclear or when the museum can document that the
graves from whence such remains were taken were disturbed with the
consent of the tribe or family of the individual which had the authority,
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Congress has enacted so much legislation for the primary purpose of
9
preservation of archaeological data for scientific and cultural purposes.
Finally, it must be noted that the proposed Commission was solely
empowered to grant orders of repatriation. This is terribly inflexible authority
considering the very legitimate competing interests of the scientific and Native
American communities. This inflexibility is characteristic of the remedial
nature of the proposed legislation. There are situations where these objects
may be preserved and studied by archaeologists and anthropologists without
depriving Native Americans of meaningful access.2w If possible, some
compromise should be attempted where disputes of this nature arise. The
proposed Commission not only fails to encourage compromise between the
parties, but it is actually incapable of implementing compromise on its own
authority. Its decision must be all or nothing: repatriation or retention.
VIII. NATIVE AMERICAN GRAVE PROTECTION AND REPATRIATION ACT
More recently, legislation for the repatriation of human remains, funerary
objects, and objects associated with Native American cultures and peoples has
been introduced in both the United States House of Representatives"' and
the United States Senate."s These proposed bills, which are quite similar,
call for a comprehensive inventory of all objects in museum collections.

under common law as it pertainsto sepulcher, to authorize the disturbance
of graves.
Where remains and grave goods are reasonably identifiable in origin
as to a present day Indian tribe or other native group, that tribe or group
has the paramount right to control the disposition of the remains or grave
goods underAmerican common law as the nearest of kin.
Senate Report on American Indian Museum Claims Commission, supra note 249, at
5-7 (emphasis added). However, the Committee has also stated that
[ais an evidentiary matter, appropriate weight must be given to tribal oral
traditions, and to traditional Native religious cultural practices or beliefs,
regarding relevant ownership, burial and mortuary, and descent and
distribution issues, where such body of traditions, laws, customs or practices
controlled at the time the sacred object left Native hands or was interred by
Native next of kin.
Id. at 7.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
260. See, e.g., Des Moines Register, July 13, 1989, at 2A (Harvard University
returned sacred pole to Omaha Indians with condition that it be preserved and remain
in local museum when not involved in ceremonial use).
261. H.R. 5237 (1990).
262. S. 1980 (1990).
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There are problems associated with the proposed legislation. As a general
rule, museums do not oppose conducting inventories of their collections. On
the contrary, such inventories provide a greater data base and yield an
enhanced knowledge regarding cultures and peoples. However, institutions
lack both the monetary and human resources necessary to complete such
inventories within the period of time contemplated by the proposed legislation.
While the requirements relating to the inventory are quite burdensome,
the more troubling aspect of the legislation relates to the radical deviation
from accepted property law. For example, section 6(c)(1) of the House
legislation proposes that "the burden shall be upon the Federal agency or
museum that has possession or control of such remains or objects to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the museum has the right of possession
to such remains or objects." 63 "Right of possession" is in turn defined as
"possession obtained with the voluntary consent of an individual or group that
had authority of alienation."2
This provision burdens museums that otherwise hold good legal title with
an overwhelming standard of proof. It is a well-settled principle under
common law and state law that possession of personal property is primafacie
evidence of ownership.O "Prima facie evidence, is deemed sufficient to
establish a given fact if not contradicted, rebutted or explained by other
evidence."26
In other words, "[p]osssession carries a presumption of
ownership. ,267 "One in possession of personal property is presumed to be
the owner until the contrary appears, and the burden of rebutting the
presumption is upon the party claiming adversely to the one in possession."2 The parties challenging title "must recover on the strength of his
269
own title, not on the alleged weakness of the [party in possession's title]."
In other words, the party claiming adversely to the party in possession of the
property bears not only the burden of rebutting the presumption that the party
in possession is the owner of the property, but must further demonstrate that

263. H.R. 5237 § 6(c)(1). See also S.1980 § 8(b), (c).
264. H.R. 5237 § 6(d).
265. United States v. Estep, 760 F.2d 1060, 1064 (10th Cir. 1985) (citing
Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. Lewis, 162 U.S. 366 (1896)); Velder v. Crown
Exploration Co., 663 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984); Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. Gildea, 456 N.E.2d 1157, 1159-60 (Mass. Ct. App. 1983).
266. Velder, 663 S.W.2d at 207.
267. Hammond v. Halsey, 336 S.E.2d 495, 497 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
268. Hattaway v. Keefe, 381 S.E.2d 569, 572 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989). See also
Justice v. Fabey, 541 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Estate of Sevems,
352 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Neb. 1984); State v. Patchen, 652 S.W.2d 265, 267 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983).
269. Hammond, 336 S.E.2d at 497.
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his or her right to possession is superior to that of the party in actual possession.27 0
In contrast to these well-established legal principles, both the House and
Senate proposed legislation would shift to museums the burden to demonstrate
"right of possession." This requirement effectively shifts the burden of proof
relating to whether transfer was voluntary and consensual, and whether
transfer was made by the party or parties who were authorized to transfer title
to the object in question. The burden to make these proofs has always rested
with the party challenging title. The Senate and House proposed legislation
would transfer the responsibility for these proofs to the party in possession.
Inspired by the fifth amendment, which states that federal government
shall not take private property "for public use, without just compensation,"
American courts have "protected property interest where a government action
might deprive an individual of an interest, derived from common law, in
peaceful possession, or freedom of use."27 It does not matter whether "the
property was being taken to meet a need of government or for the benefit of
another private individual." 27 "When the government physically takes a
person's property or allows someone other than the property owner to have
permanent physical occupation of all or part of the definable piece of property,
there is virtually a per se rule that such action constitutes a taking."273 The
House and Senate proposal to require public museums to prove "right of
possession" radically alters the respective burden that is traditionally placed
on parties under accepted state law for the adjudication of private property
rights. Regardless of the legitimacy and legality of any given transaction, the
property owner may very well be stripped of his property under the proposed
legislation because he or she is unable to supply the very difficult proof of
voluntary consent and proper authority for alienation. Such a prospective
change in state property law constitutes a taking.274 Consequently, this
provision would obligate the federal government to provide museums with just
compensation, which would involve the payment of potentially huge sums by

270. Howard v. Brown, 206 A.2d 854, 856 (Me. 1965). See also Langston v.
Cothran, 58 S.E. 956, 959 (S.C. 1907) (incumbent upon party alleging unlawful
possession to prove that he or she has the most superior right to possession).
271. 1 C. KOCH,
272. Id. at 549.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACrICE,

548-49 (1985).

ROTUNDA & J.YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 404 (3d ed.
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979) (Supreme Court has
Andrus
also
See
1986).
implied that regulations that "compel the surrender" of objects of personal property

273. J. NOWAK, R.

constitute taking that-requires just compensation).
274. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 295-97 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
concurring); Rodic v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 740 (6th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 996 (1980).
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the federal government to musuems, for many if not all of the objects that
would be repatriated under this statute.
There are a number of other significant problems arising from a standard
which utilizes the "right of possession" concept. First, the quality of evidence
relating to the circumstances surrounding any given transactioh involving
objects in a museum's collection will generally be poor. Incomplete and
inaccurate records of events that occurred many years ago make it extremely
difficult to determine how, when, and from whom an object was obtained.
Further, acquisition by the museums may have been preceded by multiple
transactions, thus heightening the difficulty of documenting the original
transaction in which rights to the object were transferred. For these reasons,
museums may be unable to meet the burden of demonstrating "right of
possession" because of inadequate records rather than because they acted
dishonestly or because they have inferior legal title.
Second, ascertaining the authority for original alienation of a given object
requires extensive historical and cultural research. Such research requires the
expenditure of substantial resources. Moreover, there may in fact be no
resolution to an inquiry into who had the authority to alienate certain objects.
Thus, the burden of establishing the authority to transfer possession and
control would be another instance in which museums could fail to establish
"right of possession" even though there is no proof that they obtained
possession improperly or because some other party has superior right of legal
title.
Third, it must be pointed out that this requirement burdens museums with
making these very difficult proofs under the stringent standard in all cases,
even where the adverse party has not challenged the museum's legal title, and
even when established principles of property law would support a determination of the museum's legal title as superior to that of the adverse party's claim
for legal title.
Finally, in the event that museums are unable to demonstrate "right of
possession" in a given circumstance, right of possession and control of the
object will be expeditiously transferred to the requesting party. However,
there is no prerequisite to said transfer of proof by the adverse party of
superior legal title to the museum or to any other party.2 75 Thus, rather than

275. For example, the Senate bill permits return upon request to any party able
to demonstrate by "a preponderance of the evidence" that either the human remains'or
funerary objects are those of an "ancestor" or of one "culturally affiliated" with the
Native American group, or that the Native American group once "owned or possessed"
the object or objects in question. S. 1980 § 5(c)(2). If the requesting Native
American group or individual satisfies this minimal burden, then "the museum shall
expeditiously return the remains or objects." Id. § 3(c)(3). The problem with this
structure of proofs is that the Native American's burden is slight and only focuses on
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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insuring that these objects are entrusted to proper parties, both the House and
Senate legislative proposals have the potential for transferring control and
possession to parties who have no legitimate interest in the objects. 76
For these reasons, the most recent proposed legislation actually represents
a step backward. Burdening museums with the obligation to prove "right of
possession" to all objects is fundamentally unfair. Such a burden constitutes
a taking and will require the federal government to compensate museums for
the deprivation of these objects. However, and much more significantly, the
most recent proposed legislation could very well result in the total deprivation
of the general public, including Native Americans, of access to these objects
and the ability to appreciate, admire, and celebrate native cultures and peoples
of our country.
IX. PROPOSAL FOR DISPUTE RESOLVING FORUM
As previously stated, each of the parties concerned with requests for the
proposed transfer of possession of Native American skeletal remains, funerary
objects, and cultural and religious objects assert very strong interests. Native
Americans wish to reinter their ancestors and utilize sacred objects in ceremonies.277 On the other hand, archaeologists, physical anthropologists, and
other professionals in related fields properly point out that retention of these

the individual's or group's interest. Thus, this exercise fails to ascertain the relative
rights of control, possession or ownership of the requesting party as against all other
interested parties.
276. Both the House and Senate bills provide that "any museum that fails to
comply with the provisions of this section shall be ineligible for Federal grants or other
assistance during any period of noncompliance." The vast majority of public museums
are extremely dependant on public, in this case federal, funding to support their
programs. Ineligibility for such funding would present public museums with a
Hobson's choice: comply with the extremely expensive inventory process or lose all
federal funding.
There is no question that Congress may, pursuant to its spending power,
condition funding of programs upon certain actions. However, the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged "that in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
'pressure turns into compulsion."' South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)
(citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). See also Clarke v.
United States, 705 F. Supp. 605, 609 (D.D.C. 1988). The proposed legislation goes
well beyond "mild encouragement" to reach the level of "compulsion." As previously
stated, museums shall be faced with the situation in which they must comply with the
legislation even though they are without the elaborate resources necessary to properly
perform the requisite comprehensive inventory.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 20, 37, 38, 40.
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objects and remains is imperative to future study and the development of
knowledge for the benefit of all mankind. 278 Without a doubt, the mogt
important action or measure that museums and Native Americans can take
toward effectively resolving this dilemma is to cultivate a dialogue with
interested Native American groups and individuals through which to exchange
their respective concerns and attempt to develop compromises which will
accommodate each set of interests. Indeed, such a process has been or is in
the process of being implemented by a growing number of institutions that
have adopted policies expressly aimed at resolving these matters.27 9
While resolution of requests for the transfer of possession of human
remains, funerary objects, and cultural and religious objects in an amicable
fashion between the concerned Native American individual or group and the
institution is ideal, such a resolution will not always be possible. Both parties,
of course, have the alternative of seeking resolution by filing an action in
court. Native Americans, of course, may file replevin claims and museums
may pursue quiet title actions.
Judicial recourse has the advantages of finality and legal sanction or
approval of the eventual resolution."s Litigation, however, requires great
expenditures of resources which neither the museums nor the Native
Americans may be financially capable of making. It would be sadly ironic if
museums were compelled to finance litigation costs at the sacrifice of funding
the inventory and study of these religious and cultural objects, funerary
objects, and human remains. It is the absence of funding of this sort that
poses a great barrier to the return of these objects and remains. It would be
similarly ironic if Native American groups were forced to use their scarce
resources on litigation so that, even if successful in litigation, they would be
unable to afford to properly care for the objects or reinter the human
remains."' Litigation also has a tendency to either create or aggravate
hostility and antagonism between the opposing parties. This is a particularly

278. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22, 37, 39.
279. See, for example, Field Museum of Natural History, Denver Museum of
Natural History, Cleveland Museum of Natural History, Florida Museum of Natural
History, Bishop Museum, Colorado Historical Society, Santa Barbara Museum of
Natural History, Museum of New Mexico, Illinois State Museum, Oklahoma Museum
of Natural History, and Rochester Museum and Science Center.
280. This element is particularly appealing to the institution in possession.
Improper return of an object could leave the institution or its officers open to liability
for unlawful conversion or breach of fiduciary duty.
281. Of course, in the case of actions to recover human remains, Native
Americans contend that the party in possession or the government should fund the
expense of reburial. Even if they were able to prevail on this point, however, the fact
remains that most Native American groups have much more urgent needs for their
resources than the financing of repatriation litigation.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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unattractive prospect in these situations where so much could be gained by
both sides through the development of a positive relationship, cooperation, and
good faith negotiati6n."2 Finally, litigation is an unattractive proposition
for both sides in that it is very difficult to evaluate prospects for success.
While generally the legal arguments that could be made on behalf of each side
in this matter are meritorious, very few cases of this sort have been reported.
Thus, it is difficult to predict how one may fare before a court of law. For all
of these reasons, it is important to consider what sort of alternative dispute
resolution mechanism might be useful in assisting the parties in reaching
solutions to these issues.
In actions involving state claims, the parties may decide to engage in
arbitration under a codified version of the Uniform Arbitration Act. 3 This
forum, although far from being ideal, may provide an adequate alternative
through which to resolve these disputes when they involve private parties.

282. Indeed, it has been to a large extent the absence of such a relationship that
has created the problem with possession of cultural objects by museums. These
institutions, as well as the scientists associated with these institutions, must strive to
explain and share the fruits of the research performed on these objects. Moreover,
Native American partnership and participation must be sought so as to better
understand these cultural and religious objects.
283. UNIFORM ARBrrRATION Acr § 1-25 (1955 & Supp. 1990). At this time, thirtythree states have adopted some form of this uniform act. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 9.43.010.43.180 (1983 & Supp. 1988); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1518 (1982 &
Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-108-201 to -108-224 (1987); COLO. REV. STAT.

§§ 13-22-201 to -22-223 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1974 &
Supp. 1988); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4301 to -4319 (1981); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901

to -922 (1979 & Supp. 1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, paras. 101-123 (Smith-Hurd
1975 & Supp. 1989); IND. CODE §§ 34-4-2-1 to -4-2-22 (1986); IOWA CODE
§§ 679A.1-.19 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422 (1982); MNE. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (1980 & Supp. 1988); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§§ 3-201 to -234 (1984 & Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19
(1988); MIcH. COMp. LAws ANN. §§ 600.5001-.5035 (West 1987); MINN. STAT.

§§ 572.08-572.30 (1988); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (1989); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-5-111 to -5-324 (1988); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to -2622 (Supp. 1988);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 38.015-.205 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -7-22 (1978
& Supp. 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to -567.20 (1983 & Supp. 1988); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to .2-20 (1976 & Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15,
§§ 801-818 (Supp. 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-7320 (1982 & Supp.
1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to -48-240 (1976 & Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to -25A-38 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -5-320
(Supp. 1988); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 224 to 238-6 (Vernon 1973 & Supp.
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-1 to -31a-18 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§§ 5651-5681 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01 to -581.016 (1984 &

Supp. 1988); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to -36-119 (1977 & Supp. 1988). *
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There remains, however, a need to implement a similar type of dispute
resolving process on the federal level.
Despite the shortcomings of the Native American Museum Claims Commission,2 such a commission or decision-making forum has great potential for
conflict resolution as an intermediary step between initial attempts by Native
Americans and museums, as well as private collectors, to resolve requests for
the transfer of possession of objects and the actual filing of lawsuits. This
forum should be available to resolve disputes regarding all Native American
cultural and religious objects, funerary objects, and human remains. To ensure
that good faith attempts at negotiation are made, there must be a period of
time between when a request is formally made and when the parties will be
permitted to come before this alternative dispute resolving forum. A
reasonable period of time may be six months to a year. While it is important
to promote some movement on the part of the museums to address these
requests by imposing the potential of third-party review, it is more important
to permit sufficient time in which fruitful discussions and negotiations may
take place between the parties. The parties should only turn to the forum
when their attempts at negotiation have completely stalled.
The forum could be implemented on an institutional level2 5 or as an
administrative body. An administrative or agency forum would be preferable
because it would provide greater perceived, if not actual, impartiality. Consequently, all interested parties would be more amenable to participation in the
forum's hearing of the issues. Correspondingly, the parties would be more
willing to accept the forum's decision as a final resolution of the dispute. The
forum's decision would also receive greater deference from the parties and,
if necessary, by the district court on review.
Rules for standing, or the right to invoke this process, should be
interpreted liberally.2 Just as in most administrative hearings or proceedings, everyone who has a legitimate or genuine interest in the object or human
remain in question should be permitted to participate. The important aspect
of this proceeding is not so much to ensure that only truly interested parties
be permitted to participate, but rather to ensure that all of the relevant interests
and concerns be fully and accurately represented and fairly considered. The

284. See supra text accompanying notes 254-60.
285. For instance, a museum might attempt to organize a dispute resolving forum
within the institution to resolve these types of requests. While this would demonstrate
good faith, Native American parties may be reluctant to avail themselves of such a
forum as they may view it as less than fully objective or impartial. Another alternative
might be for the parties to enter into a private, nonbinding arbitration process.
286. Any party who is able to demonstrate a reasonable biological, cultural, or
scientific interest in the object(s) or human remains in question should have standing
to participate in the proceedings.
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crucial issue is not who may participate, but rather who should be permitted
to exercise the right of possession and control. Thus, an emphasis must be
placed on good faith attempts to notify all interested parties
of the hearing. 2S7
In adjudicating each request, the forum must expressly consider all of the
interests raised by the parties and provide an explanation as to the significance
of each concern in reaching the ultimate decision. Each request must be dealt
with on a case-by-case basis. Thus, standards will arise from precedent rather
than out of some arbitrarily drawn set of substantive guidelines. For this
reason, it is best to have a single forum so as to ensure continuity in
decisionmaking. Standards of law-tribal, state, and federal-shall also be
considered. The forum would be required to fully explain and document with
authority its conclusions of law.3 Where possible, the forum must attempt
to devise a compromise in the adjudication of possessory rights so as to best
serve the interests of all parties involved.
It is important for several reasons that this forum go to the disputes rather
than that the parties be compelled to go to the forum. 289 In other words, the
forum should travel to the place most convenient to the parties rather than
sitting in the place most convenient to itself. First, it must be recognized that
different geographic regions contain different parties with different values and
concerns. It is imperative that the forum be aware and responsive to these
regional differences. Genuine understanding and sensitivity can best be
attained by requiring the forum to sit in the region. Second, the forum must
be made as accessible as possible. Neither the museums nor the Native
Americans should be expected to expend great resources traveling to

287. For instance, at the time the petition is filed, the claimant shall provide the
forum with a complete list of the names and addresses of all parties the claimant is
aware of who may have an interest in the disposition of the object(s) or human
remains in question. At the time the reply is filed, the adverse party shall similarly
provide the forum with a complete list of the names and addresses of all parties the
adverse party is aware of who may have an interest in the object or human remains in
question. The forum shall promptly attempt to notify by mail all of these parties, as
well as all parties that the forum is aware of who may have an interest in the particular
claim. The notice shall indicate that (1) the matter has been filed, (2) the time and
date that has been set for a hearing on the matter, (3) their right to file a written
statement with the forum, and (4) their right to address the forum at the hearing.
288. In its decision, the forum should expressly address the significant interests
raised by the parties relative to its decision, provide citations to relevant legal
principles and authority, and explain any professional standards it may have
considered.
289. To the extent possible, the forum shall hold its hearings in the general
geographic region associated with the object(s) or human remains at a location which
is reasonably accessible to the parties formally engaged in the dispute, as well as all
other interested parties.
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adjudicate their claims to these objects and human remains. It is very possible
that such a circumstance would have a chilling effect on the raising of many
of these claims.
Finally, the factual findings made by the forum should receive substantial
deference by any reviewing court. The members who would make up the
forum should have backgrounds that will give the forum collective expertise
in the applicable law, related sciences, and relevant Native American custom,
culture, and religion. This expertise is essential for the forum's factual
determinations to receive the respect of the parties and the deference of the
courts. Conclusions on matters of law, of course, must receive de novo
review. Participation in this alternative dispute resolution process must in no
way deprive any of the parties of their legal rights of access to the courts.
X. CONCLUSION

The frequency of requests made by Native Americans and Native
American groups for the possession and control of human remains, funerary
objects, religious objects, and objects associated with their cultures that are
currently contained in public and private collections is rising. Native
Americans desire possession and control of sacred objects for ceremonial use,
cultural objects to better identify with their heritage, and human remains of
their ancestors for reinterment. Institutions and scientists have been reluctant
to grant these requests because of the great scientific value of these remains
and objects.

While there is extensive federal and state statutory law currently in place
that provides prospective protection of the interests raised by both the Native
American and scientific communities, the law is completely undeveloped as
to the ownership rights to objects already collected. Litigation is, of course,
an alternative to both parties. Besides the unpredictability of the outcome due
to the undeveloped nature of the law in this area, this alternative is unattractive because of the great expense and hostility that litigation would create.
There is a need for an alternative manner in which to resolve these disputes.
A solution may involve the creation of a forum in which the concerns of
all interested parties could be voiced, and, where possible, a constructive
compromise could be crafted. This is the most sensible manner in which to
regulate the finite number of Native American religious and cultural objects
that are currently in the collections of America's public museums. Such a
forum would also provide a vehicle for responsible and respectful disposition
of Native American funerary objects and human remains that have been
disintered. We must proceed slowly and with care so as to resolve these vital
issues properly and thereby avoid the unnecessary loss of this very important
body of archaeological data. We must also make significant progress in order
to promote good will and develop a constructive partnership between Native
Americans and public museums.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol55/iss4/2
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